THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO SOCIETY IN THE LIGHT OF CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES AS EXPOUNDED BY THE ANGELIC DOCTOR

A STUDY IN THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

BY

RICHARD T. DOHERTY

Priest of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul (U.S.A.)

08

82 8309-3

ROMAE 1957

OFFICIUM LIBRI CATHOLICI - CATHOLIC BOOK AGENCY

Vidimus et aprobavimus:

Romae, apud Pont. Athenaeum « Angelicum »
die 5 Julii 1938

PETRUS LUMBRERAS, O.P.; S.Th.M.
VINCENTIUS POLLET, O.P.; S.Th.D.

IMPRIMATUR
E Vicariatu Urbis, die 17-VI-1957
† ALOYSIUS TRAGLIA
Archiep.us Caesarien. Vicesgerens

MEDIAEVAL INSTITUTE

B
765
T361Z
DC5

MEDIAEVAL INSTITUTE

1912 40 A. Phil

OMNIA IURA RESERVATA

Città di Castello, Tipografia della Casa Editrice S. Lapi

191240A Phil

TO HIS EXCELLENCY

THE MOST REVEREND WILLIAM O. BRADY, S.T.D.,

ARCHBISHOP OF SAINT PAUL

IN FILIAL REVERENCE AND GRATITUDE

Th
any s
scope.
Th
mousl
place,
tunity
Paul I
in pre
To
Most
the w
guidar
Finall
Gener
Micha
Angel



FOREWORD

This dissertation has been in manuscript since 1938 and any subsequent development of the subject is beyond its scope.

The writer takes this occasion to acknowledge, posthumously and prayerfully, his debt of gratitude, in the first place, to Archbishop John Gregory Murray for the opportunity to pursue graduate study, and secondly, to Father Paul De Rooy O.P., for invaluable assistance and suggestions in preparing this thesis.

To his Ordinary and one-time seminary professor, The Most Reverend William O. Brady (S.T.D., Angelicum '26), the writer is profoundly grateful for the formation and guidance which led him into the area of advanced study. Finally he wishes to express his appreciation to The Master General of The Order of Preachers, The Most Reverend Michael Browne, his professor, counselor and friend at the Angelicum.

PART ONE

CHAP
1.
2.

CHAP
1.
2.
3.

PART TW

CHAP
1.
2.
3.
4.

CHAP
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

CONTENTS

	Page
PART ONE: AN ORIENTATION OF THE PROBLEM	1
CHAPTER I: Sacred Science and Social Science	3
1. Theology	3
2. Social and Moral Philosophy	5
CHAPTER II: The Problem	9
1. The Basic Social Question	9
2. Purpose of this Treatise	13
3. Method of Procedure	15
PART TWO: THE FRAMEWORK	19
CHAPTER III: The Analogy of the Universe	21
1. The Notion of Collectivity	21
2. The Universe	23
3. Duplex Ordo	25
4. Another Cosmos	28
CHAPTER IV: The Framework of the Social Cosmos	31
1. The Ultimate and the Proximate Ends of Man	31
2. The Good of Man in Social Philosophy	32
3. Theological Distinction between the Good of Man in the Role of a Citizen and the Good of Man as Man	33
4. The State is a Unity of Order	34
5. The Framework in Outline, a conclusion	35

Page

PART THREE: THEORY 39

CHAPTER V: Aristotle's Philosophy
1. The Individual 41
2. The End of Man 41
3. The End of the State 42
4. « The End of Individuals and States is the Same » . 47
5. The Relation of the Individual to the State . . . 48
6. The Articulation of the Individual into Society . 50

CHAPTER VI: Aristotle in the Light of Christian Principles 52
1. The Question of Happiness 52
2. The Inconsistency of Aristotle 55
3. An Application of Divine Revelation 57
4. The End of Individuals and of Society 59
5. Christian Love of Neighbor 61

PART FOUR: AN APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO THE FRAMEWORK 63

CHAPTER VII: The Relation of the Part to the Whole In Thomistic Theology
1. The Universe 65
2. The Social Cosmos 65
3. The One Condition Upon Which the Principle's Validity Depends 69

CONCLUSION 74

BIBLIOGRAPHY 79

83

The works of St. Thomas are cited according to the Roman Leonine Edition.

The Citations of Holy Scripture are according to the Rheims-Douay Version.

The quotations of Aristotle's *Politics* are taken from the English translation by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford, 1905 ff. (Impression of 1926) while those of the *Ethics* are from the translation by D. P. Chase 1847 ff. (Revised edition, 1911).

Part One

AN ORIENTATION OF THE PROBLEM

Chapter I.

SACRED SCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

1. *Theology.* — Three questions, namely, the what, the whence and the why of all existence have disturbed man from the very beginning. They have ever agitated the thinking creature and the search for their answers has built up the edifices of science, philosophy, and theology.

Man was able to investigate his surroundings and thus to answer the first of these questions for himself. In so doing he raised monuments of science.

As to the whence of it all, however, he could learn nothing by merely looking at things. Fortunately he had a higher faculty than mere sensory perception to help him. Endowed as he was with intelligence, he was able to pass judgments upon the facts that he had observed. He made deductions and arrived at conclusions. This is how the mansions of philosophy were constructed. This is how he found that the whence, the cause of it all, must of necessity be of an order altogether different from the natural phenomena that he could observe. He reasoned to the existence of God. Beyond this point he could not go.

By his natural powers of perception he could make scientific observations and gather data. By his natural intelligence he could pass philosophical judgments on the data he had gathered and thus arrive at the existence of the supernatural. But in no way was it possible for him to explore the supernatural by the use of merely natural means. Yet, since the origin of himself and all other things was in the supernatural, the reason why they existed was to be sought in the

supernatural. Hence a divine revelation was a positive necessity if man were to know the why of his existence, if he were to know his supernatural end. (1) That in fact man received such a supernatural revelation has been amply proved. (2)

So using, firstly, the data of science, secondly, the principles of philosophy and, thirdly, the truths of revelation, man built up the branch of learning that is called Theology, the λόγος of the θεός, which is to say, the science of God.

As its name indicates, God Himself is the subject of the study known as theology. Its investigations reveal His infinite goodness and show that He is the creator of the whole universe and of all that is in it as a consequence of His excellence. It is in the very nature of goodness to diffuse itself, ***bonum est diffusivum sui,*** and, accordingly, His perfection was communicated to, and manifested, in the creation.

Since He created the universe to manifest His goodness, He is the ultimate end of all creation. Creatures, including man, exist primarily to manifest and glorify the perfection of God.

Each creature is oriented in the plan of creation to an end proper to itself and proportionate to its nature. In achieving this end the creature reflects the perfection of God and renders Him glory. The end of the rational creature is to know and to love God and it behooves man to tend to this end in all that he does.

We may sum up the whole consideration of man and God by saying that Theology teaches that God is the first cause and the last end of man and the relationship of man to God thus elucidated settles upon man certain moral obligations.

This brings into relief the two major divisions of Sacred Science. The part that teaches the dogma of the relation of man to God is called Dogmatic Theology while the systematic study of the moral obligation that attend upon that teaching is called Moral Theology.

---

(1) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 1, art. 1.

(2) Garrigou-Lagrange, P. Fr. Reg., O.P., *De revelatione*, p. 399 ff.

Thus we see that moral theology is a study based upon the relationship of man to God. Moreover, we see that man is of his very nature an integral part of this relationship and, as such, he can never be considered apart from it.

We must bear in mind, however, that it is not only one man who is thus oriented to God. It is rather the orientation of many men simultaneously. For this reason St. Thomas says that the end of many taken together is the same as the end of one man. (3) God is the ultimate end of human society as well as of each human life in the same way that the whole army as well as the individual soldier is oriented to the military leader. (4)

The first obligation that this relationship settles upon the individual soldier is submission to the leader and the second obligation is coordination and cooperation with the other soldiers. (5) In like manner the obligations that the God and man relationship settles upon the individual man are twofold. The first concern directly man's personal duties to God while the second concern his coordination with society.

The study of this coordination, then, forms a subdivision, as it were, of moral theology, to which we can apply the name, « social moral theology » and as such it is to be distinguished from social moral philosophy.

2. *Social and Moral Philosophy.* — A good example of moral philosophy is Aistotle's *Ethics* and by the same token his *Politics* is a classic of social philosophy. These two works are so intimately connected that they may be taken as one treatise because, as St. Thomas points out, the doctrine of the books of ethics contains the first elements of political

---

(3) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, cap. 14: « Oportet eumdem finem esse multitudinis humanae qui est hominis unius ».

(4) *Sum. Theol.* I-II, qu. 100, art. 6: « Finis ... humanae vitae et societatis est Deus ... sicut etiam in exercitu, qui ordinatur ad ducem sicut in finem, primum est quod miles subdatur duci ... secundum vero ut aliis coordinetur ».

(5) Ibidem.

science. (6) The former is a sort of an introduction to the latter.

We see, even now, at least one difference between social moral theology and Aristotelian moral and social philosophy. In the former case social questions are but a subdivision of the study of morals whereas in the latter intance morals are considered as a subdivision of political science, a difference that Kurz consideres to be of moment. (7)

In his *Ethics* Aristotle discusses man's happiness but he does not speak of happiness in the future life. He is concerned solely with such happiness as is to be found in this life. (8) Likewise he speaks of virtue but he refers to such virtues as are directed to civil life. (9) For him the important thing is to be a good citizen.

In short, Aristotelian social and moral philosophy considers only man's proximate end, the needs of this life, temporal happiness, civic virtue and the like. (10) Theology, however, looks beyond such things to man's ultimate end, the union with God. Whereas social and moral philosophy is

---

(6) *In X libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 2: « Dicit autem ad Politicam pertinere consideratione ultimi finis humanae vitae de quo tamen in hoc libro determinat quia doctrina huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae ».

(7) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin, München* (Kösel and Friedrich Pustet) 1932, p. 30: « will man hier einen Unterschied zwischen Thomas und Aristoteles sehen, so liegt er darin, dass für Aristoteles die Politik das Umfassende ist und die Ethik ein Teil der Politik, dass Thomas aber die Politik unter die ' moralis philosophia ' einordnet und nach der Behandlung der Ethik gleichsam nur ' ad complementum philosophiae ' noch zur Politik weiterschreitet. »

(8) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « Est notandum quod Philosophus non loquitur hic de felicitate futurae vitae sed de felicitate praesentis vitae.

(9) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 161, 1 ad 5: « Dicendum quod Philosophus intendebat agere de virtutibus secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem, in qua subiectio unius hominis ad alterum secundum legis ordinem determinatur et ideo continetur sub iustitia legali. »

(10) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « Moralis enim philosophia habet considerationem circa omnia quae sunt necessaria vitae humanae... tota moralis philosophia videtur ordinari ad bonum civile. »

content to hold that society enables man to lead a virtuous life, theology goes further and declares that by leading a virtuous life man is oriented to an ulterior end which consists in the enjoyment of heavenly things. (11)

Aristotle does not take heavenly things into account in his social-moral philosophy because the scope of philosophy is limited to such things as can be examined in the light of natural reason alone and the supernatural can never be explored by purely natural means. (12) Theology, on the other hand, considers things not only in the light of human reason but also in the light of divine revelation and in this way it is empowered to treat of the supernatural.

If we were to limit our considerations to sciences that treat of purely human affairs and their proximate ends we could perhaps agree with Aristotle that social philosophy occupies the preeminent position among them. But, in a larger sense, the science that treats of the ultimate end of the whole universe, namely theology, surely holds a still higher place, as St. Thomas rightly maintains. (13)

It is not a question of antithesis between social science and sacred science. It is rather a case of the one being of a higher order, more comprehensive and more perfect. Sacred

---

(11) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, cap. 14: « Sed quia homo vivendo secundum virtutem ad ulteriorum finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione divina... : Oportet eumdem finem esse multitudinis humanae qui est hominis unius. Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam. »

(12) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 9: « Loquitur in hoc libro... de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi. Nam felicitas auterius vitae omnem investigationem rationis excedit. » cf. also Garrigou-Lagrange, P., Fr. Reg., O.P., *De Revelatione*, 2nd edit., Rome, 1932, p. 399 ff.

(13) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 9: « Sciendum est autem quod politicam dicit esse principalissimam, non simpliciter sed in genere activarum scientiarum quae sunt circa res humanas quarum ultimum finem Politica considerat. Nam ultimum finem totius universi considerat scientia divina quae est respectu omnium principalissima. Dicit autem ad Politicam pertinere considerationem ultimi finisi humanae vitae de quo tamen in hoc libro determinat quia doctrina huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae.

science does not shut out social science but on the contrary it includes or absorbs and elevates it. Whereas social science depends entirely upon human reason, whether it be deductive as in Plato or inductive as in Aristotle, sacred science employs not only the data of emperical science and the principles of philosophy but in addition it brings revealed truth to the aid of human effort, to supplement and to perfect it. The one widens the perpective of the other by adding divine revelation to the human outlook; it widens the scope to include not only man's proximate end but also his ultimate end.

Chapter II.

THE PROBLEM

1. *The Basic Social Question.* — We have seen that the whole of moral theology is based upon the relation of man to God. We have seen that once this relationship has been established certain moral obligation arises spontaneously and follow as a necessary consequence.

It is in exactly the same way that social obligations depend upon the relation of the individual to society. As Robert Linhardt says in his notable work, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des heiligen Thomas von Aquin,* the relation of the individual to society is the basic question of all social ethics. (1) All other social questions are found upon it. They spring from it and are consequential to it. The « very definition of society itself, » according to Charles Miltner, is dependent upon this relationship. (2)

---

(1) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des heiligen Thomas von Aquin,* Freiburg im Breisgau (Herder) 1932, p. 132: « ' Individuum und Gemeinschaft, ' diese sozialethische Grundfrage taucht immer wieder auf, wenn man das System der christlichen Sozialethik entwickeln und die Probleme der christlichen Gesellschafts- und Staatslehre lösen will. » In the next sentence he refers to it as the « Grundfrage aller übrigen sozialethischen Fragen. »

(2) Miltner, Charles C. S. S., Ph. D., « Scope of a Realistic Philosophy of Society, » in *Philosophy of Society,* Charles A. Hart, Ed., Philadephia, (Dolphin Press) 1934, p. 3: « A paramount question in any social philosophy has always been the relation of the individual to society. The answer whatever it may be, will obviously enter into and modify one's theory of law, and hence of rights and duties, of the origin of moral obligation and the extent of civil power, and so ultimately of the very definition of society itself ».

To be sure, a question so basic should have the status of a postulate rather than that of a problem but unhappily that has not been the case. Not only was it a problem for Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, et al., but it has been a bone of contention in Catholic circles. The stormy début of the social formula of Heinrich Pesch, S.J., known as « Solidarismus, » is a case in point.

As in all problems of this kind, every solution offered claims support in authoritative sources. Thus E. Troelsch (3) read in the Gospels a noteworthy individualism only to be contradicted by O. Schilling. (4)

St. Thomas, however, has been the stormy petrel of the whole affair. The long and bitter controversy over Spann's theory known as « Universalismus, » received its greatest impetus when the support of the Angelic Doctor was claimed by Spann. (5)

Now, a question that evokes so much discussion naturally produces a rich literature and as a result the works on the social theory of St. Thomas, Thomistic state-philosophy, and philosophy of rights are legion. Yet in this mass of literature the most basic of all social questions remains confused, as Kurz (6) has shown in his careful orientation of the problem. He arraigns forty-four competent opinions and classifies them.

The first classification is of sixteen opinions branding St. Thomas as an individualist. The second, which is a sort of a subdivision of the first, comprises five quotations. To these should be added two more opinions which P. Kurz discusses elsewhere in his book and which brings up to twenty-three the number of those that see individualism in Aquinas.

---

(3) Troelsch, E., *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, 3rd. ed., Tübingen, 1923, p. 39 ff.

(4) Schilling, Otto, *Die christlichen Soziallehren*. München, 1926, p. 14 f.

(5) Spann, Othmar, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1930, p. 46; cf. also Von Nell-Breuning, Oswald, S.J., *Reorganisation of Social Economy*, Milwaukee (Bruce) 1936, p. 86, footnote 1.

(6) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, München (Joseph Kösel und Friedrich Pustet) 1932, p. 9 ff.

The third division has only two citations. They hold that a rugged individualism characterized primitive Christianity which, however, did not perdure into the middle ages.

Ten quotations of those who find the bond of society strongly emphasized in the middle ages gives us a fourth group while nine citations from those who steer a middle course constitute the fifth classification.

What conclusion is to be drawn from such facts? One group says that the Angelic Doctor is an individualist while an other group says just the opposite. Nay more, as Kurz points out, often the two opinions are to be found, unreconciled yet side by side, in the same author. (7)

It is unreasonable to believe that such contradictions could exist in the mind of any one man and a fortiori it is hard to believe that they existed in one of the greatest minds of all time. Such confusion must be the product of many minds, for St. Thomas has had many spokesmen.

The atmosphere, however, has cleared somewhat of late. Catholic opinion is fairly well unified and today no one would attempt to espouse a theory that would subordinate man to the state. The question of the day is not so much « Where do we stand? » as « Why? »

Watkins answers the question thusly: « since only individuals can in the strict sense contemplate, the primacy of contemplation involves a primacy of the individual over the society, » (8) while others seize upon the Christian exaltation of the human being as the solution to be problem. (9) These

---

(7) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 18: « Diese Übersicht über einschlägige Ausserungen in der Literatur über Thomas und in den von Thomas beeinflussten Werken zeigt uns nur, dass das Rätsel bestehen bleibt. Die einen sehen Individualismus, die anderen sein Gegenteil; oft stellen die gleichen Autoren die beiden Anschauungen unvermittelt nebeneinander hin oder man glaubt in versöhnlicheres Miteinander behaupten zu dürfen. »

(8) Watkin, E. I. *A Philosophy of Form*. London (Sheed and Ward) 1935, p. 167.

Cf. Haas, Francis, Man and Society, New York (Century Co.) 1930, chapter II, « Human personality. »

answers are good as far as they go. But, granted that the human race is composed of rational creatures who have a supernatural end, there still remains the question of the relation of one individual man, so endowed and so destined, to the collectivity of men who enjoy the same prerogatives. (10)

De Wulf, (11) on the other hand, displays a fine appreciation of the problem. He strikes directly at the heart of the question of the relation of the part to the whole. He argues that since only the individual has substantial existence and since St. Thomas holds that the civil society is merely an unity of order, the state has no existence apart from the individuals that compose it. Its existence depends upon and exists for the citizen.

But the tendency to sacrifice society to the individual is equally as disastrous as modern efforts to sacrifice the individual to society, as De Rooy points out. (12) And we must remember that attempts to sever the bonds that tie the individual to the state are at the same time gnawing away at the strands that bind the state to the individual. If we free one of all obligation we automatically free the other and the individual is cut adrift.

The letter is the error of modern individualism which Jacques Maritain has so well portrayed. He writes: « What is modern individualism? A misunderstanding, a blunder; the exaltation of individuality camouflaged as personality, and the corresponding degredation of true personality.

« In the social order, the modern city sacrifices the *person* to the *individual;* it gives universal suffrage, equal rights, liberty of opinion, to the *individual,* and delivers the *person,*

---

(10) Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles,* liber I, cap. 78.

(11) De Wulf, Maurice, « L'Individu et le groupe dans la Scolastique du XIII[e] siècle », in *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie,* (XXII, Nov. 1920): « L'Etat est pour le bien du citoyen, et ce n'est pas inversement le citoyen qui est pour l'Etat ».

(12) De Rooy, R.P., Paul, O.P., « La Nature de la Société selon St. Thomas » in *Angelicum,* VI, Rome, 1929, pp. 483-496.

isolated, naked, with no social framework to support and protect it, to all the devouring powers which threaten the soul's life, to the pitiless actions and reaction of conflicting interests and appetites, to the infinite demands of matter to manufacture and to use. To all the greeds and all the wounds which every man has by nature, it adds incessant sensual stimuli, and the countless hords of all kinds of errors, sparkling and sharpened, to which it gives free circulation in the sky of intelligence. And it says to each of the poor children of men set in the midst of this turmoil: You are a free individual; defend yourself, save yourself, all by yourself '. It is a homicidal civilization. » (13)

2. *Purpose of this Treatise.* — The fact that there are so many answers at variance with each other, seems to justify our humble effort to establish the theological basis for the Catholic teaching on the relation of the individual to society according to St. Thomas. To the best of our knowledge, such an investigation of Thomistic theology has not as yet been made.

De Wulf has done well with a philosophical approach. In the magnificent work of Linhardt, *Die Sozialprinzipen des hl. Thomas von Aquin,* (14) the question is buried beneath a mass of other considerations. Kurz, has succeeded in bringing to light a grand array of pertinent Thomistic texts but that he has done much more than that is to be doubted.

As Welty points out, (15) the book of Kurz spontaneously

---

(13) Maritain, Jacques, *Three Reformers,* London (Sheed and Ward) 1936, p. 21.

(14) Linhardt, Dr. Robert, *Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin,* Freiburg im Breisgau (Herder) 1932, p. 132 ff.

(15) Welty, Eberhard, *Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch,* Salzburg-Leipzig (Verlag Anton Pustet) 1935, the fifth foot-note accompanying the introduction to be found on p. 392: « Wir glauben dass gerade die Schrift von Kurz den Wunsch wach werden lässt nach einer ergänzenden Arbeit, die weniger den Textbefund als den Gedankengang und die Gedankenentwicklung in den Vordergrund bringt. »

creates the demand for a supplementary work which should be not so much a table or catalogue of texts as a development of the Thomistic thought process that covers the situation. This is necessitated, he points out, (16) by the fact that the solution to the problem does not rest full-blown and ready to be picked from some page of the writings of Aquinas. Inasmuch as Thomas has nowhere expressly treated our question as such, his teaching on it is something that must be formed and fashioned, built up, so to speak, out of the raw material of Thomism. It is not merely a matter of reading off texts. Conclusions must not flow from isolated passages but rather from the Thomistic system as a whole. It is necessary to orientate the question in the system.

Welty says that Kurz quotes passages from St. Thomas concerning the relation of the individual to society which sound surprisingly conclusive but which are, in reality, Aristotelian phrases that Thomas is quoting in their original wording. That, he protests, does not mean that Aquinas always makes the sense of these words entirely his own. He maintains that Thomas will neither volatilize nor disown the pregnant metaphysical ideas of his doctrine as a whole by the repetition and taking over of Aristotelian words. (17)

This observation is, we feel, a happy one inasmuch as the

---

(16) Idem, *ibidem*, « Thomas hat unsere Frage nicht ausdrücklich und unmittelbar gestellt, wenigstens nicht in der allgemeinen Form, die uns heute so sehr interessiert... Die thomistische Lösung unserer Frage liegt in den Schriften des Aquinaten nicht fertig vor; sie braucht nicht nur abgelesen zu werden; sie muss aus den Gedanken des Aquinaten entwickelt werden. »

(17) *Ibidem*, p. 393 (foot-note): « Ganz sicher will Thomas durch die Wiederholung und Übernahme aristotelischer Worte die tragenden metaphysischen Ideen seiner Gesamtlehre weder verflüchtigen noch leugnen. Die von Aristoteles übernommenen Sätze, die Verhältnis von Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch betreffen, klingen überraschend ausschliesslich und 'total'. Thomas zitiert die Sätze in ihrer ursprünglichen Fassung, d.h. in jenem Wortlaut, in dem sie sich bei Aristoteles finden. Damit ist nicht gesagt, dass Thomas sich auch immer (oder überhaupt) den Sinn dieser Worte restlos zu eigen macht. Wir glauben, dass Kurz nicht immer scharf genug darauf geachtet hat. »

idea seems to persist in some quarters that St. Thomas must either take Aristotle or leave him. Some do not seem to have grasped the idea of reconciliation at all. They completely miss the point of St. Thomas' connection with the Stagirite. And those who think that St. Thomas abandons Christian theology to follow pagan philosophy are as much in error as those who think that he parts company altogether with Aristotle. Reconciliation is the keynote of Christian Aristotelianism and Thomistic social moral theology must be studied in the light of this reconciliation, and, to that end, our immediate concern is to discover how St. Thomas articulates Aristotelian moral and social philosophy into his theology.

3. *Method of Procedure.* — It is well nigh meaningless to speak of an individual part without reference to the whole to which it corresponds. As Jacques Maritain has so well said, « The word individual is common to man and beast, to plant, microbe and atom. » (18)

Naturally we are concerned with the term only insofar as it applies to man but even here caution must be observed due to the many and various roles that he may play. As a football player, for instance, he is an individual part of the whole that is called a team. Insofar as he is a citizen, he is the ultimate division of the whole that is termed the state. The soldier is the indivisible part of the army and the sailor is a separate part of a ship's crew.

So before we can speak of the individual part intelligently we must have a clear notion of the whole. In the words of Von Nell-Breuning: « We cannot conceive the individual as he really is unless we consider, at the same time, the society of which he is a member. The double relationship of the individual to society and of society to the individual, has

---

(18) Maritain, Jacques, *Three Reformers:* p. 20; also, Garrigou-Lagrange, P. Reg. O.P., *Les Sens Commun*, Paris, 3rd Edition, 1922, p. 333.

been intended by the Creator, and we must not only recognize it but make it the basis of scientific investigation. » (19)

Accordingly, we must first of all find out just what St. Thomas means by the part and the whole. We must investigate and expose the framework upon which he constructs his social theory.

Perhaps no one has delineated this framework so concisely and yet so accurately as has E. F. Jacobs. He writes: « the universe is regarded as a single whole, mankind as a single society. Every being, whether an individual or a joint-being (i. e. a community), is an integral part, an organic member of the whole; its action is determined by the final cause of the universe; but at the same time it is also a whole in itself, a diminished copy or microcosm of the larger world, the macrocosm. Thus the unified world is not sharply unified; it is a community made up of communities, articulated and organized in the most diverse fashion, each of value to the whole, each essential to the larger existence. » (20)

We may say that here is a sort of a scheme for the next phase of our investigation, not only as to the factors to be considered but also as to the order in which they are to be seen. This study will comprise the following (i. e. the second) division of our treatise.

The third part of our work will be devoted to a study of the principles involved in the doctrine of the relation of the individual to society. And in this connection we must remember that « The chief function of Scholasticism was to reconcile the teachings of Aristotle, ' The Philosopher ' with those of Christianity » (21) and we cannot grasp the signi-

---

(19) Von Nell-Breuning, Oswald, S.J., *Die Soziale Enzyklika*, Köln (Katholische Tat-Verlag) 1932 — English translation entitled *Reorganization of Social Economy*, by Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., Milwaukee, (Bruce) 1936, p. 207.

(20) Jacob, E. F., « Political Thought » in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, edited by C. G. Crump and E. F. Jacob, Oxford, 1926, ff., p. 517.

(21) Hankins, Frank Hamilton, « Sociology » in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, H. E. Barnes, Ed., New York, (Knopf) 1925, p. 274.

ficance of any reconciliation before we see what was to be reconciled. To this end we must subdivide this phase of our investigation. The first subdivision will be given over to an analysis of Aristotle's development of the question, while the second subdivision will be an examination of Aristotle's theory in the light of Christian principles as exemplified in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Inasmuch as « The thought of the Middle ages was . . . essentially theocentric and the great medieval thinkers were one and all of them theologians » (22) the second subdivision will be an observation of the process of articulating Aristotelian social philosophy into Thomistic theology.

The fourth and final part of our treatise will be the application of the principles to the frame-work. It will be a process of clothing the skeleton in flesh, as it were.

---

(22) Harris, C. R. S., « Philosophy » in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, edited by C. G. Crump and E. F. Jacob, Oxford, 1926 ff., p. 227.

Part Two

THE FRAMEWORK

Chapter III.

THE ANALOGY OF THE UNIVERSE

1. *The Notion of Collectivity.* — The notion of a collectivity according to St. Thomas involves two points, namely, a plurality of individual beings, *pluralitas suppositorum*, and a certain unity, *quaedam unitas*. (1) It is essentially a plurality and hence cannot be one, a unit pure and simple, *simpliciter*. Nevertheless, in virtue of the fact that it has some sort of unity, *quaedam unitas*, it is a unit at least to the extent to which it is united, *secundum quid*.

A number of separate and distinct stones is obviously a plurality. Yet, if we place these stones close enough to each other to form a pile, then in virtue of their relative positions, or the order of them, *secundum ordinem*, they are a unity of order, *unitas ordinis*. According to the *accident* of position, *secundum accidens*, they are one despite the fact that they remain separate substances and hence are a plurality *secundum substantiam*.

St. Thomas expresses this idea more concisely and with greater clarity than we could ever hope to unfold it and accordingly we shall let him speak for himself. He says: « Quae vero sunt diversa secundum substantiam, et unum secundum accidens, sunt diversa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid; sicut multi homines sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt unus acervus, quae est unitas compositionis aut ordinis. » (2)

---

(1) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 31, art. 1 ad 2.

(2) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 17, art. 4.

Thus St. Thomas gives us the first hint of his concept of society. He says that many men are one people and many stones are one pile in virtue of their unity which is a unity of composition or order. Yet this is only a hint. We cannot jump at some conclusion based on the idea that society is to be given no more consideration than a pile of stones. Both are unities of order, it is true, but society is that and much more than that.

The true Thomistic concept of society cannot be found in any isolated sentence or paragraph. According to those who appear to have made the most serious investigation on this point, we must have a bird's-eye of the universe and of all things in it as the work of God before we can understand St. Thomas when he speaks of any part of the universe and when he speaks of human society as a part of the universe.

Edelbert Kurz says that for St. Thomas human society is a whole within the whole of the universe, « *die menschliche Gemeinschaft* » is a « *Totum innerhalb des Ganzen des Universums.* » (3)

Lindhardt says that for Aquinas the plan of the universe is the plan of human society. He refers again and again to the parallel between the macrocosmos and the socialcosmos. « *Parallelcharakter zwischen Naturkosmos und Sozialkosmos.* » (4)

The Thomistic concept of society can be found only in the theology of St. Thomas. It is only in the light of his theology concerning the creation that we see his social moral theology. Linhardt develops this idea at length in his notable work, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin* under the general heading of « Die Sozialbedeutung des philosophisch-theologischen Weltbildes. » (5)

---

(3) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, München (Kösel und Friedrich Pustet) 1932. p. 37.

(4) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, Freiburg im Breisgau (Herder) 1932, p. 76.

(5) Linhardt, op. cit., loc. cit.

2. *The Universe.* — When we turn our attention to the Thomistic universe the first thing that strikes us is that it, like the heap of stones, is an « ordo unitatis ». « Totum universum est unum unitate ordinis » are the words of St. Thomas. (6) But that does not mean that the order of the universe which has fascinated and staggered the greatest minds of all times is the same as the order existing in a heap of stones. There are obviously varying degrees of order. The order that we have seen in the stones is the simplest and poorest form of order. It is mere position. The order of the universe is quite another thing.

That the universe is a *pluralitas suppositorum* there can be no doubt. Not only is the variety of creatures incredible but also their number is beyond all reckoning. Yet in the face of such overwhelming multiplicity there is no confusion. The earth swings with measured cadence in its orbit around the sun; the harmony of the spheres suffers no discord, whereas without order all would be chaos. « Ubi est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. » (7) The only thing that renders the forces of creation good and useful rather than evil is the order that pervades them. « Bonum universi in quodam ordine consideratur. » (8)

The existence of order leads the Angelic Doctor to another consideration because things that are diverse do not come together in orderly fashion of themselves. They must be put together. « Quae autem diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno ordinarentur. » (9) « Manifestum est enim quod plures multa et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniatur. » (10) He says that the order of things manifestly demonstrates the existence of some governing or ruling power. « Ipse ordo rerum manifeste demonstrat gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum

---

(6) *Quodlibet*, VI, art. 19.
(7) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 42, art. 3.
(8) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I. cap. 85.
(9) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 11, art. 3.
(10) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 103, art. 3.

bene ordinatum. » (11) He brings out this idea vividly by means of the analogy borrowed from Aristotle. He compares the universe to an army. As the army is ordered to its general so the universe is ordered to an objective outside of itself. « Totum universum ordinatur ad id quod est extra mundum, sicut exercitus ordinatur ad ducem. » (12) Naturally, the ruling and directing force *extra mundum* to which he refers is God.

The theological explanation of the ordination of each and every part of the universe to God starts with the axiom ***bonum est diffusivum sui*** which St. Thomas borrows from Pseudo-Dionysius. (13) Since it is in the very nature of goodness to diffuse itself and the goodness of God is infinite, it behooved Him to communicate and manifest His goodness by means of the creation. (14).

Since He created the universe to manifest His goodness, He is the ultimate end of all creation. Creatures, including man, exist primarily to manifest and glorify the perfection of God. (15) « I have created him for my glory. » (16) God is at once the first cause and the last end, He is « Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.» (17)

Each creature is ordained in the plan of creation to an end proper to itself and proportionate to its nature. This is the perfection of itself, *bonum creaturarum.* When this goal has been attained the creatures, in virtue of their own perfection, concur in the perfection of the whole created order of which they are a part, and in so doing they give glory to God. (18) « All the earth is full of His glory. » (19) The earth

---

(11) *Idibem,* I, qu. 103, art. 1.

(12) *Summa Contra Gentiles,* liber I, cap. 78.

(13) *Ibidem,* liber III, cap. 24.

(14) *Ibidem, Sum. Theol.,* I, qu. 44, art. 4; *Vatican Council,* Session 3. Chapter 1, canon 1, (Denziger 1783).

(15) *Ibidem.*

(16) *Isaias,* XLIII, 7.

(17) *Apocalypse,* XXII, 13.

(18) *Sum. Theol.* I, qu. 65, art. 2.

(19) *Isaias,* VI, 3.

and the other planets whirling in space, the vegetation that grows upon the earth, the animals that freed upon the vegetation, all manifest the perfection of God. Each, according to its own nature and capacity, renders him glory. (20) « The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of His hands. » (21)

Hence, in the same way that the army is ordered to the leader the parts of the universe are ordered to God. « Omnia creatura ordinatur in Deum. » (22) He Who is the highest in the order of being and in the order of causation is naturally the highest in the order of government. « Omnium entium rector exstat est igitur perfectus in essendo et causando, ita etiam et in regengendo perfectus. »(23) He calls the « tota communitas universi » a « communitas perfecta » governed by the « lex aeterna » of God. (24) The order of the universe, he points out, demonstrates the justice of God. « Ordo universi qui apparet in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis, demonstrat Dei iustitiam. (25)

3. *Duplex Ordo.* — But in addition of the ordination of the whole universe to God there is another ordination of the parts of the universe to each other. Even though an army were ordered to its leader or general it would be nothing but an unwield mob were it not for the order of its parts to each other. The soldiers must be formed into ranks and each warrior have his part to play, a special function to perform, if the whole army is to be of any real service to its leader. So the classic analogy of the army is made to include this idea. The complete text of this analogy is as follows: « Duplex bonum ordinis invenitur in universo: unum quidem, secundum quod totum universum ordinatur ad id quod est extra mun-

---

(20) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2; Gf. Linhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
(21) *Psalms*, XVIII, 2.
(22) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 21, art. 1, ad 3.
(23) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 1.
(24) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 91, art. 1.
(25) *ibidem*, I, qu. 21, art. 1.

dum, sicut exercitus ordinatur ad ducem; aliud secundum quod partes universi ordinantur ad invicem, sicut et partes exercitus; secundus autem ordo est propter finem primum. » (26)

St. Thomas calls the *ordo ad invicem* of the parts of the universe a *mirabilis connexio,* which indeed it is. First of all there are many grades of being. The classic triple division of beings into the mineral, the plant and the animal kingdom is well known. But within each of these kingdoms there is also a gradation of being so that the differences between the highest forms of plant life and the lowest forms of animal life are hardly discernible. There is a perfect continuity of beings running from the lowest and simplest on up to the highest and most complex.

The Angelic Doctor says: « Hoc autem modo mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest. Semper enim invenitur infinuum supremi generis contingere supremum inferioris generis: sicut quaedam infima in genere animalium parum excedunt vitam plantarum, sicut ostrea, quae sunt immobilia, et solum tactum habent, et terrae in modum plantarum adstringuntur; unde et beatus Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. de Div. Nom., ' quod divina sapientia coniungit fines superiorum principiis inferiorum. ' » (27)

The *connexio rerum,* however, is more than mere continuity. In addition to the various grades of being there is a causal relation between grade and grade. The lower grade exists for the higher grade. Plants could not grow without the mineral kingdom but the primary purpose of plants and herbs is to provide food for and thus to sustain the life of the animals. « Semper imperfectiora propter perfectiora sunt » (28) and hence the lower are subject to the higher, « Inferiores quodam ordine reguntur a Deo per superio-

---

(26) *Summa Contra Gentiles,* liber I, cap. 78.
(27) *Ibidem,* liber II, cap. 68.
(28) *Sum. Theol.,* II-II, qu. 66, art. 1.

res, » (29) and by the same token the material is governed by the spiritual. « Sic creaturae sunt spirituales creaturae, quod a creaturam corporalem aliquem ordinem habent et toti creaturae corporali praesident. » (30) « . . . haec autem unitas ordinis attenditur secundum quod quodam ordine reguntur corporalia per spiritualia et inferiora per superiora, ut Augustinus dicit in De Trin. 3. » (31)

The parts of the universe are ordained to help one another. « Omnes autem partes huius mundi inveniuntur ordinatae ad invicem secundum quod quaedam a quibusdam iuvantur. » (32) And that this ordination has a cohesive force that tends to make a unit of this universe is expressly mentioned by Aquinas. He says, « ordo rerum habent quanto aliquid est superius, tanto habet virtutem magis unitam et ad plura se extendentem. » (33)

Indeed the sense, the *secundum quid*, in which the universe is a united whole is a very real sense. There is a continuity of the grades of being according to which the lower serve the higher and the higher, in turn, dominate the lower, making each dependent upon and helpful to the other. In addition to this mutual helpfulness and effective relationship of one part to the other there is the relationship of the totality to one common goal. This is what St. Thomas meant when he said that a « Duplex bonum ordinis invenitur in universo. »

Now, if a collectivity is a unit *secundum quid* in virtue of *quaedam unitas*, namely the mere position of its parts, a fortiori a double ordination of the parts results in greater unity and deeper coherence. To be sure the universe is not *unum simpliciter*, for it is a plurality, but the *secundum quid*, or the sense in which it is a unit, is more effective than the *secundum quid* of the pile of stones. It has the duplex ordo

---

(29) *Ibidem*, III. qu. 59. art. 6 ad 3.
(30) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 61. 4.
(31) *Quodlibet* VI, art. 19.
(32) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 6.
(33) *Sum. Theol.* I. qu. 57, art. 2.

which for Aristotle is the characteristic mark of the whole. (34)

4. *Another Cosmos.* — A term that expressively characterizes the universe as multiplicity of parts and a true unity of order is « Cosmos. » And because a prodigious number of individual parts or cells are regulated and ordered with such precision that they make a unity of order that we call the human body, the term cosmos has been applied to the human organism analogously. It is a microscopic reproduction of the order of the universe and, accordingly, it is referred to as the microcosmos in contradistinction to the cosmos proper which for greater clarity is spoken of as the great or *macro* cosmos.

St. Thomas says that man is called a « little world. » « Homo dicitur minor mundus. » (35) But he goes even further than that. He applies the concept of the cosmos to the whole human race. « Sic igitur consideremus totum humanum genus, sic totam rerum universitatem. » (36)

Reference has already been made to the various grades of being that comprise the universe. (37) The primary division of them according to their perfection is into orders or kingdoms, « inanimata . . . plantae . . . animalia . . . irrationalia . . . intellectus substantiae. » (38) The intellectual creatures, it is to be noticed, is one of these « kingdoms. » The « totum humanum genus » stands as one order in the midst of the other orders. (39)

Since the « *totum humanum genus* » is one of the orders that constitute the universe it, like the other orders, is subject

---

(34) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 10, 1075 a; Cf. also St. Thomas, II Sent., Dist. IX, qu. I, art. 6 ad 1.

(35) *Sum. Theol.*, , qu. 91, at. 1.

(36) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 23, art. 5 ad 3.

(37) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 65, art. 2 ad 3; I, qu. 47, art. 2 ad 3.

(38) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 97.

(39) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 75.

to the laws that govern the universe. « Tam in rebus humanis, quam in rebus naturalibus hoc communiter invenitur quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a potestate universali. » (40) The same laws operate in the social cosmos and in the natural cosmos. « In omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentiae quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. » (41)

Like all the parts of the universe, it is ordered to God as to final goal. « Totum universum cum singulis suis partibus ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem; inquantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » (42) There is, in this regard, only one distinction between the *intellectus substantiae* and the other orders. All the parts of the universe render material glory to God « inquantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » Over and above this ordination to God of the whole universe with all its parts, the rational creatures are ordered to their final end in a very special way. In addition to the material glory given to God they alone of all creatures render him formal glory. This consists in knowing and in loving Him. « Quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione cognoscendo et amando. » (43)

As for the *ordo ad invicem* of the parts of the human race, St. Thomas the direct comparison to the order found in the universe. He follows his accustomed method of comparing the individual man, the *minor mundus*, to the universe, and then making the analogy between the social cosmos, and the cosmos of all nature. He says: « Quia vero homo habet et intellectum et sensum et corporalem virtutem, haec in

---

(40) *Sum Theol.* I, qu. 110, art. 1.
(41) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 82, art. 4.
(42) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 65, art. 2.
(43) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2.

which for Aristotle is the characteristic mark of the whole. (34)

4. *Another Cosmos.* — A term that expressively characterizes the universe as multiplicity of parts and a true unity of order is « Cosmos. » And because a prodigious number of individual parts or cells are regulated and ordered with such precision that they make a unity of order that we call the human body, the term cosmos has been applied to the human organism analogously. It is a microscopic reproduction of the order of the universe and, accordingly, it is referred to as the microcosmos in contradistinction to the cosmos proper which for greater clarity is spoken of as the great or *macro* cosmos.

St. Thomas says that man is called a « little world. » « Homo dicitur minor mundus. » (35) But he goes even further than that. He applies the concept of the cosmos to the whole human race. « Sic igitur consideremus totum humanum genus, sic totam rerum universitatem. » (36)

Reference has already been made to the various grades of being that comprise the universe. (37) The primary division of them according to their perfection is into orders or kingdoms, « inanimata . . . plantae . . . animalia . . . irrationalia . . . intellectus substantiae. » (38) The intellectual creatures, it is to be noticed, is one of these « kingdoms. » The « totum humanum genus » stands as one order in the midst of the other orders. (39)

Since the « *totum humanum genus* » is one of the orders that constitute the universe it, like the other orders, is subject

---

(34) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 10, 1075 a; Cf. also St. Thomas, II Sent., Dist. IX, qu. I, art. 6 ad 1.

(35) *Sum. Theol.*, , qu. 91, at. 1.

(36) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 23, art. 5 ad 3.

(37) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 65, art. 2 ad 3; I, qu. 47, art. 2 ad 3.

(38) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 97.

(39) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 75.

to the laws that govern the universe. « Tam in rebus humanis, quam in rebus naturalibus hoc communiter invenitur quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a potestate universali. » (40) The same laws operate in the social cosmos and in the natural cosmos. « In omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentiae quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. » (41)

Like all the parts of the universe, it is ordered to God as to final goal. « Totum universum cum singulis suis partibus ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem; inquantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » (42) There is, in this regard, only one distinction between the *intellectus substantiae* and the other orders. All the parts of the universe render material glory to God « inquantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » Over and above this ordination to God of the whole universe with all its parts, the rational creatures are ordered to their final end in a very special way. In addition to the material glory given to God they alone of all creatures render him formal glory. This consists in knowing and in loving Him. « Quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione cognoscendo et amando. » (43)

As for the *ordo ad invicem* of the parts of the human race, St. Thomas the direct comparison to the order found in the universe. He follows his accustomed method of comparing the individual man, the *minor mundus,* to the universe, and then making the analogy between the social cosmos, and the cosmos of all nature. He says: « Quia vero homo habet et intellectum et sensum et corporalem virtutem, haec in

---

(40) *Sum Theol.* I, qu. 110, art. 1.
(41) *Ibidem,* I, qu. 82, art. 4.
(42) *Ibidem,* I, qu. 65, art. 2.
(43) *Sum. Theol.,* I, qu. 65, art. 2.

ipso ad invicem ordinantur, secundum divinae providentiae dispositionem, ad similitudinem ordinis qui in universo invenitur: . . . Ex eadem autem ratione, et inter ipsos homines ordo invenitur. »(44)

A true order of unity is the human race. It is a whole according to the analogy of the universe and it is a whole within the whole of the universe. It is like a circle within a circle.

---

(44) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 81.

Chapter IV.

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SOCIAL COSMOS

1. *The Ultimate and the Proximate Ends of Man.* — The captain of a ship at sea has two primary concerns; one is to bring his boat safely into the port for which it is bound and another is the care of the vessel itself. St. Thomas employs this analogy to bring into relief the two primary concerns of man. (1) Like the ship, man is destined to a goal beyond himself, namely God, but, at the same time, he must take proper care of himself. These two objectives are called, in theology, the ultimate and the proximate ends of man respectively.

In the case of the ship the task of caring for the vessel itself is not assumed by the captain directly but is left to others, such as the ship's carpenter, the purser, and so on.(2) So in the case of man, the care of him insofar as the needs of this life are concerned, which St. Thomas likens to the

---

(1) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 14: « Si ... aliquid ad finem extra se ordinetur, ut navis ad portum, ad guvernatoris officium pertinebit non solum, ut rem in se conservet illaesum, sed quod ulterius ad finem perducat. »

(2) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 14: « ... quod ad extrinsecum ordinatur, multipliciter cura impeditur a diversis. Nam forte alius erit qui curam gerit, ut res in suo esse conservetur; alius autem, at ad altiorem perfectionem perveniat, ut in ipsa navi, unde gubernationis ratio assumitur, manifeste apparet. Faber enim lignarius curam habet restaurandi, si quid collapsum fuerit in navi, sed nauta sollicitudinem gerit, ut navem perducat ad portum; sic etiam contingit in homine. »

care of the vessel itself, is entrusted to civil authority (3) but the charge of directing him to his final end is upon the ministers of the Church of Christ. (4)

2. *The Good of Man in Social Philosophy.* — If, however, there should exist some thing with no end extraneous to itself, the only care that it would require would be the conservation of itself (5) and this is the key to all of Aristotle's moral and social philosophy in contradistinction to Christian theology.

His moral philosophy does not consider anything beyond those things necessary for human life. (6) And, since the political society has the care of all things necessary for the conservation and amelioration of human life, he, logically enough, holds that « the state or political community . . . is the highest of all . . . embraces all the rest » and « aims, in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. » (7)

In keeping with this his idea of virtue is not virtue in the Christian sense. It is what we would call civic virtue inasmuch as it is directed to civil life only. (8) And in this light his

---

(3) *Ibidem*, caput 15: « Rex legem . . . divinam edoctus, ad hoc praecipuum studium debet intendere, qualiter multitudo sibi subdita bene vivat : . . . Sic igitur bona vita per regis officium in multitudine constituta, consequens est ut ad eius conservationem intendat. »

(4) *Ibidem*, caput 14: « Si . . . aliquid esset, cuius finis non esset extra ipsum, ad hoc solum intenderet gubernatoris intentio, ut rem illam in sua perfectione conservaret illaesum . . . Sed est quoddam benum extraneum homini quamdiu mortalliter vivit, scilicet ultima beatitudo, quae in fruitione Dei expectatur post mortem. . . . Unde homo . . . indiget alia spiritualia cura per quam dirigatur ad portum salutis aeternae; haec autem cura per ministros Ecclesiae Christi fidelibus exhibetur. »

(5) *Ibidem.*

(6) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « Moralis enim philosophia habet considerationem circa omnia quae sunt necessaria vitae humanae. »

(7) Aristotle, *Politica*, I, 1, 1252 a.

(8) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « tota moralis philosophia videtur ordinari ad bonum civile; » *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 161, art. 1 ad 5: « Dicendum quod Philosophus intendebat agere de virtutibus secundum quod ordinatum ad vitam civilem. »

moral philosophy is nothing but a subdivision of politics, the first elements of the political science, as it were. (9) Nevertheless, all virtue, says St. Thomas, is directed to some good (10) but the important point is that not all of the virtues are directed to the same good.

The Angelic Doctor then goes on to show that the good proper to one thing differs from the good proper to something else. What is good for man is not necessarily good for a horse. (11)

3. *The Theological Distinction Between the Good of Man in the Role of a Citizen and the Good of Man as Man.* — Due to a fact that we pointed out early in our inquiry, namely, that man may be considered under many different aspects corresponding to the diverse roles that he may play, what may be good for man under one aspect may not be advantageous for him in another role. (12)

We demonstrated our point by several examples. We said that man may be considered as a member of a football team, as a citizen of some particular state, as a soldier or as a sailor. The *bonum* that he seeks in any one of these roles is not the same as that to which he tends in another capacity. The football player aims at victory on the field of sport. As a citizen man seeks help in carrying on his existence and

(9) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 1: « Dicit autem ad Politicam pertinere considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae de quo tamen in hoc libro determinata quia doctrna huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae. »

(10) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 55, art. 4: « Virtus... est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. » *Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus in Communi.* qu. 1, art. 9: « manifestum est quod virtus uniuscuiusque rei est per quam operationem bonum producit. »

(11) *Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1, art. 9: « Bonum... proprium uniuscuiusque rei est aliud ab eo quod est proprium alterius: diversorum enim perfectibilium sunt diversae perfectiones: unde et bonum hominis est aliud a bono equi et a bono lapidis. »

(12) *Ibidem*, « Ipsius etiam hominis secundum diversas sui considarationes accipitur diversimode bonum. »

peace in the pursuit of happiness. The thing that man strives for in the capacity of a soldier is not the same end that he would seek as a sailor.

This is exactly the same idea that St. Thomas brings out here and to demonstrate his point he shows the difference between the good of man insofar as he is a citizen of a state and the good of man insofar as he is a man, that is to say, a rational creature destined for eternal glory. The good of man insofar as he is a man consists in the perfection of his intellect in the beatific vision. On the other hand, all the good that is proper to man insofar as he is a citizen is to be derived from civil society. (13) Consequently, the end of man insofar as he is a man is God (14) but the end of man insofar as he is a citizen is the civil society. (15)

4. *The State is a Unity of Order.* — Now the reason why man as man is not ordered to civil society (16) is to be found in the fact that civil society is a unity of order in contradistinction to a unit pure and simple. In virtue of the fact that it is not one and indivisible, it is composed of many parts each of which has its own existence independent of and apart from the existence of the whole. Consequently each part may have operations or actions which are independent of and apart from the operation of the whole. (17)

---

(13) *Ibidem*, « Non enim idem est bonum hominis inquantum est homo, et inquantum est civis; nam bonum hominis in quantum est homo, est ut ratio sit perfecta in congitione veritatis... nam homo habet quod sit homo per hoc quod sit rationalis; bonum autem hominis in quantum est civis, est ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes. »

(14) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 21, art. 4 ad 3: « totum quod homo est et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum. »

(15) *Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1, art. 9: « bonum .... hominis in quantum est civis, est ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes. »

(16) *Sum. Theol.* I-II, qu. 21, art. 4 ad 3: « homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua. »

(17) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 1: Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo vel domestica familia, habet solam unitatem ordinis, secundum quam

In the reverse order this also holds true. The unity of order may have operations which cannot be performed by parts in themselves. St. Thomas demonstrates this by using the familiar example of the army. He considers the military conflict to be the operation of the whole rather than of the parts. In like manner the parts can operate independently of the whole inasmuch as the man who is a soldier has certain activities which are proper to him as a man but which have no connection with his military service. Insofar as he is a soldier he is a part of the unity of order that is the army, but it is not the whole man that is oriented to the army.

St. Thomas says that civil society, like an army, is an unity of order. Hence its parts, that is to say, its citizens, may have activities which are completely independent of the whole. Therefore St. Thomas readily admits that man in his role as a citizen is oriented to the civil society (18) to the extent that a soldier is ordered to the army. But just as it is not the whole man that is ordered to the army so it is not the whole man that is ordered to civil society. Man as man, and the whole of man, is oriented to one end, one goal, only. That goal is God. (19)

5. *The Framework in Outline.* — With this passage from Aquinas we feel that we have reached the climax of this part of our investigation. At the very outset we said that « it is

---

non est aliquid simpliciter unum. Et ideo pars eius totius potest habere operationem, quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in exercitus habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus. Habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuius partium, sed totius; puta conflictus totius exercitus. Et tractis navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem. » This is the passage that De Wulf, in our opinion, misinterpreted and the one to which we referred, in that connection, earlier in our treatise.

(18) *Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1. art. 9: « inquantum est civis ... ordinetur secundem civitatem. »

(19) *Sum. Theol.* I-II, qu. 21, art. 4 ad 3: « homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua ... Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum. »

well nigh meaningless to speak of an individual part without reference to the whole to which it corresponds. » Subsequent inquiry revealed that the individual part that corresponds to the whole of creation is the creature while man is the ultimate division of humanity.

Our last few pages exposed the Thomistic concept of civil society. We saw that its end was not the same as that of the *totum humanum genus*. The latter is ordered to a supernatural end in contradistinction to the natural end of the former, and the line of demarkation between the two is made decisive by the words of St. Thomas to the effect that societies are differentiated according to their ends, « secundum diversa ad quae perficienda societas ordinatur, oportet societates distingui. » (20)

Now then, we have three « wholes » in reference to which we can speak of individual parts. The individual part of the whole of creation is the creature. Anything at all, regardless of whether it be a stone, a plant, an animal or a man is an individual part of the universe so long as it can be classed as a creature, so long as it possesses one feature, namely, that it has been created.

The human being is the individual part of the whole that is humanity. Any man, whether he be white or colored, tall or short, sinner or just, in sickness or in health, is a part of this *totum*. The single factor upon which depends membership in the human society is humanity. This is the only feature that the part and the whole must have in common for the part to correspond to the whole and the whole to the part.

The third whole that we have seen is the civil society, the *civitas*, and we have seen that the citizen is the individual part that corresponds to this whole. Its relationship to the human race can be seen more easily if we take some one country, the United States of America, for example.

Not every man on earth is a citizen of the American repub-

---

(20) Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem, cap. III, circa med.

lic. It may be likened to a circle within the circle representing the human race. Every being within the inner circle is a man because it lies wholly within the circle that swmbolizes humanity. But not every man within the outer ring is a citizen of The United States because it is not all of them that are embraced by the inner circle.

The common denominator of the part and the whole in the case of the smaller circle is American citizenship, whereas the denominator common to the part and the whole of the larger circle is, as we have seen, humanity. Hence, it is clear that the American citizen is a part of the American civil society in so far as he is an American citizen but not in virtue of the fact that he is a man. Here have force the words of Goethe, « Above all nations is humanity. »

Inasmuch as we have already likened the human race to a circle within a circle representing the whole of creation, and we have compared the civil society to a still smaller circle lying within the circle of the human race, we can clearly recognize three distinct wholes or unities. St. Thomas considers each of these wholes or collectivities in turn and points out the relation of the part to the whole in each case.

While it is clear that every American citizen is a man and that every man is a creature, according to our diagram, it is equally plain, by the same token, that not every creature is a man and not every man is a citizen of the United States. Therefore, for accuracy and precision in terminology, we will use the term « creature » to indicate the individual part that corresponds to the whole of creation, the term « man » in reference to mankind, and the term « citizen » in connection with civil society only.

PART THREE

THEORY

Chapter V.

ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

1. *The Individual.* — Although Confucius had formulated some social rules for the Chinese (1) and the social question loomed large in the religions of all Oriental peoples (2), it remained for the culmination of ancient cultures in the Periclean Age to produce the first philosophy of society, properly so called, in Plato's *Republic.*

The motif running all through the Platonic philosophical system denies the real existence of individual beings. Individuals are but so many reflections or shadows of one being called the universal which alone has real existence. Plato derives the individual from the universal. The latter is his starting point. (3)

With his pupil, Aristotle, however, a reaction set in. The pupil maintained that all philosophical speculation must start with the individual. It is, he says, only the individual of which we have any knowledge at all. As for the universal, we must derive our knowledge of it from the individual. Quite naturally then, we may expect the social thought of Aristotle to bear some contrast to his master's philosophy of society at least insofar as the mooted question is involved.

---

(1) *Cf. Hasting's Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* under « Confucius. »

(2) Cf. Turner, William, *History of Philosophy,* Boston (Ginn) 1903, ff., p. 11 f.

(3) *Ibidem.*

Accordingly in Plato's *Republic*, « there is complete subordination of the individual to the State. » (4) Plato's view of society « denies the reality of the parts. For him the individual is nothing, the State everything. The individual is absolutely sacrificed to the State. » (5)

Aristotle on the contrary maintains that nothing but the individual has substantial existence. He « combats the state absolutism of Plato. » (6) He attributes to the individual man an intrinsic worth. Man, he says, dominates the earth and the lower orders of creation are all oriented to him.

The author of the *Politics*, says that plants exist for the sake of animals « and that the other animals exist for the sake of man; the tame for use and food; the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must he that she has made all animals and plants for the sake of man. » (7)

Man, however, exists for the sake of nothing but himself. All other things have their end in him but his end he possesses in himself. This follows from the fact that for Aristotle the Intellect is the part of man that « is most truly man » (8) and « the Working of the Intellect . . . , is thought . . . to aim at no End beyond itself. » (9)

2. *The End of Man.* — Even the virtue of which the Stagirite speaks is not directed to an end outside of and superior

---

(4) Wallis, Wilson D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, New York (Knopf) 1927, p. 51.

(5) Stace, W. T., *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*. London (Macmillan) 1924, p. 322.

(6) Turner, William, *History of Philosophy*, Boston (Ginn) 1903 ff., p. 155.

(7) Aristotle, *Politics*, (translation by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford, 1905 ff.) I. 8. 1256 b.

(8) Idem, *Ethics*. (translation by D. P. Chase, 1847 ff. — all citations are from the revised edition of 1911 (Everyman's Library) X. 7, 1177 b.

(9) Idem, *ibidem*.

to man. It is not based upon the relationship of man to God that we considered in our discussion of Christian theology. It is love of self that characterizes the virtuous man.

To explain this seeming paradox we must resort to the Aristotelian syllogism which we frame thusly: The virtuous man gratifies his intellect; but the intellect is man's « self; » therefore the virtuous man gratifies himself.

The import of the major premise is made clear when Aristotle says that « the good man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to reason; and the baser sort . . . grasp at pleasure. » (10) Again he declares that, « the good man does what he ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is best for itself and the good man puts himself under the direction of the Intellect. » (11) Finally he points out that « a man . . . anxious to do, more than other men, acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and, in general, ... to secure to himself that which is abstractedly noble and honourable. . . . gratifies that Principle (i. e., intellect) of his nature which is most rightfully authoritative, and obeys it in everything. » (12)

The minor of our syllogism, namely, that the intellect is man's « self » flows from the fact that the intellect « is characteristic of man. » (13) Aristotle says that « Man has reason . . . and man only. » (14) To be sure, he is called the « rational animal » in contradistinction to the brute with which he has all other things in common. Hence man is man insofar as he has intelligence and, accordingly, Aristotle says that « this Principle is most truly Man. » (15) « In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man's 'Self'. » (16)

The conclusion that the good man gratifies himself and

---

(10) Idem, ***Ethics***, X, 9, 1180 a.
(11) Idem, ***ibidem***, IX, 8, 1169 a.
(12) Idem, ***ibidem***, IX, 8, 1168 b.
(13) Idem, ***Politics***, I, 2, 1253 a.
(14) Idem, ***Ibidem***, VII, 13, 1332 b.
(15) Idem, ***Etihcs***, X, 7, 1178 a.
(16) Idem, ***Ibidem***.

that virtue is a form of self-love is summed up thusly: « he is most truly Self-loving who loves and gratifies this Principle.

« Again, men are said to have, or fail of having, self-control, according as the Intellect controls or not, it being plainly implied thereby that this Principle constitutes each individual; and people are thought to have done of themselves, and voluntarily, those things specially which are done with Reason.

« It is plain, therefore, that this Principle does, either entirely or specially, constitute the individual man, and that the good man specially loves this. For this reason then he must be specially Self-loving, in a kind other than that which is reproached, and as far superior to it as living in accordance with Reason is to living at the beck and call of passion, and aiming at the truly noble to aiming at apparent advantage. (17)

Aristotle assumes that happiness is « the one end of all human things. » (18) But « happiness is the realization and the perfect exercise of virtue. » (19) Therefore « the one end of all human things » is « the realization and perfect exercise of virtue. » (20)

But since virtue, as we have seen, is not directed to any end other than man himself, man's final end is in himself. Thus Aristotle's moral system is systematic selfishness.

Thus we clearly see the importance of man, nay more, of the individual man, in Aristotelian moral and social philosophy. While the order of intellectual beings is the *raison d'être* of all the other orders, each individual intellect aims « at no end beyond itself. » Not only physical but also moral

---

(17) Idem, *Ethics*, IX, 8, 1168 b. and 1169 a.

(18) *Ethics*, X, 6, 1176 a.

(19) *Politics*, VII, 13, 1332 a; see also: *Ibidem*, VII, 9, 1328 b: « happiness cannot exist without virtue; » *Ibidem*, 1329 a; *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 b: « each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise actions. »

(20) Cf. *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1324 a: « the best life... is the life of virtue. »

values are appraised according to this norm insofar as man's virtue is not inspired by love of God but by love of self; it aims at no end beyond man himself. Aristotle's world is anthropocentric.

Indeed, to portray St. Thomas as an individualist, on the basis of the importance of the individual, it seems hardly necessary to make the Angelic Doctor part « company altogether with Aristotle. » (21)

Again, those who stress the Thomistic principle that only the individual has substantial existence (22) are only revealing the close bond between the Stagirite and Aquinas inasmuch as this principle is characteristic of the Aristotelian system as opposed to Platonic universalism.

Moreover, those who base their conclusions regarding the relation of the individual to society on the patent fact that for St. Thomas only the individual has substantial existence are shooting wide of the mark because, as our development of the subject will reveal, this principle is not the focal point of the question.

3. *The End of the State.* — Happiness, says Aristotle, « cannot exist without virtue. » (23) He claims that « each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. » (24) In fact, for him, « happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue. » (25) Hence it follows that « the best life . . . is the life of virtue. » (26).

Man, however, is so constituted by nature that he cannot

---

(21) Cf. Riedl, Clare, « The Social Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, » in *The Philosophy of Society*, p. 14.

(22) Cf. De Wulf, Maurice, « L'Individu et le groupe dans la scolastique du XIII^e^ siècle, » in *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie*, XXII, Nov. 1920, p. 384.

(23) Aristotle, *Politics*. VII, 9, 1328 b; *ibidem*, VII, 1329 a.

(24) Idem, *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 b.

(25) *Ibidem*, VII, 13, 1332 a.

(26) *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1324 a.

lead the best life in isolation inasmuch as « man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice is the more dangerous. » (27) « He is the ' Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, ' whom Homer denounces — the outcast who is a lover of war. » (28) Since he « is by nature a political animal » (29) « in the natural order of things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner. » (30)

Accordingly, he says that « a state exists for the sake of a good life, not for the sake of life only: . . . Nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the sake of mutual intercourse . . . virtue must be the serious care of a state which truly deserves the name . . .

« It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of exchange . . . Then end is the good life . . . And the state is the union of families and villages having for an end a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life.

« Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. » (31) In fact, the Stagirite defines the state as a group of human beings who are living together for the purpose of leading « the best life possible. » (32)

There can be no doubt that the state exists in order to help man to lead a virtuous life and, since man's happiness depends upon his virtue, the ultimate end of the state is to enable man to be happy. (33)

---

(27) *Ibidem*, I, 2, 1253 a.
(28) *Ibidem*, I, 2, 1253 a.
(29) *Ibidem*.
(30) *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 a.
(31) *Ibidem*, III, 9, 1280 a-1281 a.
(32) *Ibidem*, VII, 8, 1328 a: « a state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible. »
(33) Cf. Turner, William, *History of Philosophy*, Boston (Ginn) 1903 ff. p. 155: « Aristotle starts with the principle that man is by nature a social

4. « *The End of Individuals and States is the Same.* » — We have thus far seen Aristotle's theory of the end of the individual man and also his conception of the end of society. That they are the same is the next point that the Stagirite proposes to establish. « We ought, » he says, « to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals. » (34)

As we have already seen, he not only found that the life of virtue was most eligible for the individual but he also determined that « political society exists for the sake of noble actions. » (35)

« Assuming, » he continues, « that enough has been already said in exoteric discourses concerning the best life, we will now only repeat the statements contained in them. » (36) and there follow such statements as:

« Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. » (37)

« Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue. » (38)

That « the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state . . . no one denies. » (39)

We have only to recall that he had said that happiness is « the one end of all human things » (40) to follow his train of argument to his conclusion that « the end of individuals and of states is the same. » (41)

---

being . . . and is forced to depend upon the social organization for the attainment of happiness. » The mission of the « state is consenquently . . . the advancement and development of its subjects. »

(34) *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 a.
(35) *Ibidem*, III, 9, 1281 a.
(36) *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 a.
(37) *Ibidem*, 1323 b.
(38) *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 b.
(39) *Ibidem*, 1324 a.
(40) *Ethics*, X, 6, 1176 a.
(41) *Politics*, VII, 15, 1334 a.

5. *The Relation of the Individual to the State.* — We have already seen that Aristotle combats the universalism of Plato in general and Platonic state absolutism in particular. Whereas the author of the *Republic* denies the reality of the parts of society, Aristotle attributes to them great importance even to the point of making man the sole object of virtuous acts.

Yet, in the face of this individualism, the Stagirite says that it is « more noble and godlike » « to discover and preserve » the good of the community than to serve the good of the individual. (42)

He reasons as follows: « grant that this (the good) is the same to the individual and to the community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more perfect to discover and preserve: for to do this even for a single individual were a matter of contentment; but to do it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.» (43)

Here Aristotle seems to make two extremes meet. Take, for example such statements as these: « it is to himself that each individual wishes what is good, » (44); « each man desires good for himself most of all, » (45); and « the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain. » (46)

The inference would seem to be that man is acting contrary to nature when he sacrifices an immediate and personal advantage for the good of a friend or for his country but Aristotle says, « No », even such apparent sacrifice is an expression of self-love.

« Of the good man, » Aristotle says, « It is true that he does many things for the sake of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying for them, if need be: for money

---

(42) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 2, 1094 b.
(43) *Ibidem.*
(44) Aristotle, *Ethics*, IX, 3, 1166 a.
(45) *Ibidem*, VII, 7, 1159 a.
(46) Aristotle, *Politics*, II, 5, 1263 b.

and honours, and in short, all the good things which others fight for, he will throw away while eager to secure to himself the *kalòn*: he will prefer a brief and great joy to a time and enduring one . . . And this is perhaps that which befalls men who die for their country and friends; they choose great glory for themselves: and they lavish their own money that their friends may receive more, for hereby the friend gets the money but the man himself the *kalòn*: so, in fact, he gives to himself the greater good . . .

« In short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give to himself a larger share of the honourable.» (47)

It is obvious that the full import of this statement hinges upon the meaning of the Greek work *kalòn* and we doubt that an accurate equivalent is to be found in the English language. However, in this context it is used to signifiy a thing of spiritual beauty in contradistinction to that which has mere material worth. It corresponds with the gratification of the intellect which we have just discussed. Although it is not supernatural reward in the Christian sense, it is, nevertheless, a spiritual reward and more precious than material goods.

He says that « it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. » (48)

Hence, it is that the common good is « greater and more perfect to discover and preserve » than private good. For a man to perform noble acts even to the point of giving his life « even for a single individual were a matter of contentment; but to do it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike. » (49)

---

(47) Aristotle, *Ethics*, IX, 8, 1169 a.

(48) *Idem*, *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 b.

(49) *Idem*, *Ethics*, I, 2, 1094 b; the explanation of the term « godlike » is to be found in Aristoties idea that man's intellect « is in him a divine Principle » and « so too will life in accordance with it be divine » (*Ethics*, X, 7,

6. *The Articulation of the Individual into Society.* — He articulates the individual into the social framework on the principle that « the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. » (50) The reason why man needs society, is, as we have already seen, to lead a good life. But « the best life, both for individuals and for states, is the life of virtue » (51) and since, as we have likewise seen, the good of the community is to be preferred to the good of the individual, it follows that « the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole. » (52) Hence « The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives. » (53) Lest some may consider themselves exceptions to this rule, Aristotle says that it must not be supposed « that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. » (54)

He says: « the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole . . . A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and justice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which may use for the worst ends. » (55)

1177b). He is comparing what is divine with that which is more divine. He makes a distinction between bonum commune materialiter sumptum and bonum commune formaliter sumptum. Materially considered the good of the community is the same as the good of the individual, but formally considered the former is more « god-like. »

(50) Idem, *Politics*, I, 2, 1253 a.
(51) *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1324 a.
(52) *Ibidem*, I, 13, 1260 b.
(53) *Ibidem*, VIII, 1, 1337 a.
(54) *Ibidem*.
(55) Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 2, 1253 a.

With reason then does he say that the isolated « may be compared to an unprotected piece in the game of draughts.» (56) And that « the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. » (57)

---

(56) *Ibidem.*
(57) *Ibidem.*

Chapter VI.

ARISTOTLE IN THE LIGHT OF CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES

1. *The Question of Happiness.* — Aristotle says that happiness consists in activity (1) and St. Thomas agrees with him. Nay more, Thomas cites the « Philosopher » in this connection. (2)

« Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence, » the Stagirite continues, « of course that Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the best Principle, » and « the working of this in accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect Happiness. » In this opinion too, Aquinas concurs. He says that the highest happiness of man consists in his highest activity. (3)

That « the Intellect is the highest of our internal Principles » (4) Thomas further agress with Aristotle (5) with the

---

(1) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 6, 1177 a: « Happiness stands not in... pastimes but Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before ».

(2) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 2: « Philosophus dicit, quod ' felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam ' ... necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio. »

(3) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 a.

(4) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 12, art. 1: « ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat. »

(5) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 a.

result that they both hold that the essence of happiness consists in intellectual activity. (6)

Whereas Aristotle's « conception of the gods is that they are above all blessed and happy » (7) St. Thomas maintains that beatitude in the higest degree is proper to God. (8)

By a process of elimination the Stagirite arrives at the conclusion that intellectual activity is especially characteristic of the gods (9) while the Angelic Doctor holds that the very essence and existence of God is His intellectual activity. (10)

« God . . . » Aristotle rightly concludes, « is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature, » (11) and in keeping with this St. Thomas declares that God is blessed of His very essence. (12)

Men, however, are not happy and blessed of themselves as is God. The only beatitude that man enjoys is a certain participation in the divine beatitude. This is the Thomistic concept (13) which is not unlike that of Aristotle who says

---

(6) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 5: « optima . . . potentia est intellectus; » *ibidem*, II-II, qu. 182, art. 1: « vita contemplativa convenit homini secundum illud quod est optimum in ipso, scilicet secundum intellectum. »

(7) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 b: « the Working of the Intellect » is the « highest Happiness, » the « perfect Happiness. » *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 4: « essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit » and *Ibidem*, I, qu. 12, art. 1: « ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus. »

(8) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 26, art. 1: « beatitudo maximae convenit Deo. »

(9) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 8, 1178 b: « everyone believes that they live, and therefore that they Work because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? »

(10) *Sum. Theol.* I, qu. 14, art. 4: « cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis, ut dictum est, ex necessitate sequitur, quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius essentia et eius esse. »

(11) Aristotle, *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 b: Cf. also *Ethics*, X, 8, 1176 b.

(12) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 1 ad 1: « Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam. »

(13) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 2: « Ostensum est . . . quod esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo: solius enim Dei Beatitudo est suum esse: » *Ibidem*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 1 ad 1: « Deus est beatitudo per essen-

that life is blessed « to men insofar as there is in it some copy of » the activity of the gods. (14)

That such a life is difficult of attainment in this world Aristotle readily admits. He says that « such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man will live thus, not insofar as he is a man but insofar as there is in him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the life in accordance with it be divine compared with man's ordinary life.

« Yet we must, so far as we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance with the highest Principle in us. » (15)

Again the words of St. Thomas (16) run parallel to those of Aristotle. He says that God is blessed and happy in His very essence inasmuch as His essence is His intellectual activity. He derives His happiness not from some source outside of Himself but from Himself. He is unique in this respect.

---

tiam suam: non enim per adeptionem, aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati ... per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem dicuntur: » *Ibidem*, I, qu. 26, art. 2: « In Deo ... non est aliud esse, et intelligere secundum rem, sed tantum secundum intelligentiae rationem. Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo secundum intellectus, sicut et aliis beatis, qui per assimilationem ad beatitudinem ipsius beati dicuntur. »

(14) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 8, 1178 b.

(15) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 b and 1178 a.

(16) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 2: « in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam; quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, quia non fruitur alio, sed seipso. In angelis autem beatitudo est ultima perfection secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato; et haec operatio est in eis unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem secundum statum praesentis vitae est ultima perfectio secundum operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo. Sed haec operatio nec sempiterna, nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia operatio intercissione multiplicatur; et propter hoc in statu praesentis vitae perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest. »

Angels derive their beatitude from Him. They see Him constantly and their contemplation of Him is incessant. In this way they are united to Him for all eternity and hence their beatitude is everlasting and complete.

Men too may participate in the divine beatitude but this participation is difficult in this life inasmuch as they do not see God face to face and they are not permanently and finally united to the source of their happiness. Hence, in this present life man's happiness is far from perfect.

At this point St. Thomas once more pauses to remark that he and Aristotle are in agreement. (17) He says that the latter, in treating of man's happiness in this life, comes at lenght to the conclusion that it can never be perfect. But this is the last time that we find St. Thomas giving his assent to Aristotle in this connection because we have now reached the parting of their ways. That they walk no more together is, however, not due to any ill will but simply to the fact that the Stagirite does not go any farther; he has reached his stopping place.

2. *The Inconsistency of Aristotle.* — Aristotle says: « we are unwilling to pronounce the living happy by reason of their liability to changes, and because, whereas we have conceived of happiness as something stable and no way easily changeable, the fact is that good and bad fortune are constantly circling about the same people: for it is quite plain, that if we are to depend upon the fortunes of men, we shall often have to call the same man happy, and a little while after miserable, thus representing our happy man 'Chameleon-like and based on rotteness.' » (18)

---

(17) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3 art. 2: « Unde Philosophus, ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens: ' Beatos autem dicimus ut homines ' » The whole of chapter X of the first book of Aristotle's Ethics is on this matter and the words that Aquinas quotes here are the concluding ones of that chapter.

(18) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 10, 1100 b.

At length he asks the question: « Are we then to call no man happy while he lives, and, as Solon would have us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this position, is a man happy when he is dead? or is not this a complete absurdity, specially in us who say Happiness is a working of a certain kind? » (19)

He then goes on to explain that Solon does not mean to say that a dead man is happy in a positive sense but merely in a negative sense insofar as a dead man is forever « out of the reach of evils and misfortunes. » (20) But even in this pessimistic version, the opinion of Solon, according to Aristotle, « admits of some dispute, since it is thought that the dead has somewhat both of good and evil. » (21) He maintains that it is absurd « to pronounce the man blessed » after death. (22) At all vents, the « future is dark to us » (23) he says.

Although men can never be truly happy, nevertheless he chooses to « call them among the living blessed who have and will have the things specified » (24) elsewhere in his treatise as conducive to happiness. His last words on this point are a reminder of the fact that he is speaking only of imperfect happiness. He deigns to call some blessed only with the specification that they are « blessed as men. » (25)

But St. Thomas, holding fast to the basic Aristotelian principle that « nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, » (26) follows the train of Aristotelian thought to its logical conclusion. He argues that it is contrary to reason to suppose that the desire for happiness has been implanted

---

(19) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 10, 1100 b.
(20) *Ibidem.*
(21) *Ibidem.*
(22) *Ibidem.*
(23) *Ibidem*, 1101 a.
(24) *Ibidem.*
(25) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 10, 1101 a.
(26) Idem, *Politics*, I, 8, 1256 b et passim; *Ethics* passim.

by nature in vain; that it was given only to be frustrated. (27) But, as we have just seen, to say that man can never be permanently and perfectly united to the source of his beatitude by means of the operation of his intellect, as are the angels, is to suppose that the desire for happiness has been implanted by nature in vain. Therefore such a statement is contrary to reason.

Yet Aristotle stands helpless in this situation. He is able to discuss happiness as it is to be found in this life but when it comes to the question of happiness in the future life he is lost for the simple reason that, as St. Thomas points out, human reason cannot investigate the happiness of the next life. (28) This point we made at the very beginning of this treatise.

3. *An Application of Divine Revelation.* — We have now come to the practical application of this fact to the question at hand. « Aristotles' view was . . . scientific in the best sense. » (29) His basic principles, not excluding the one that would have nature make nothing in vain, are data obtained by actual observation of these principles at work in the natural order. In this respect he employs the empirical method throughout.

Aristotle found that although « nature makes nothing

---

(27) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 12, art. 1: « hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si numquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel numquam beatitudinem obtinebit . . . Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. » For a discussion of the natural desire for happiness see Darrigou-Lagrange, P. Reg., O.P. *Le Réalisme du Principe de Finalité*, Paris, Desclée De Brouwer et Cie 1932, Chapter V. « La finalité de la Vonlonté et son Réalisme, » pp. 260-284.

(28) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber 1, lect. 9: « loquitur in hoc libro . . . de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi. Nam felicitas alterius vitae omnem investigationem rationis excedit. »

(29) Hankings, Frank Hamilton, « Sociology » in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*. H. E. Barnes, ed. p. 274.

incomplete and nothing in vain, » nevertheless all the happiness that he could observe on this earth was far from being a perfect fulfillment of man's natural desire for happiness. The logical conclusion, then, is that man's ultimate happiness is to be found elsewhere. But Aristotle did not look elsewhere because without a supernatural revelation, he could not. The future, he said, « is dark to us. » (30)

Turning to divine revelation we find that just as Aristotle had said that « the future is dark to us » so St. Paul says: « We see now through a glass in a dark manner. » (31) But here he does not falter or stumble in the dark as does Aristotle. In the light that came to him on the road to Damascus, he walks sure-footedly. There is no trace of indecision in his assurance that we shall, in the hereafter, see God « face to face. »

As Matthew says, we « shall be as the Angels of God in heaven » (32) and, thus united to God for all eternity as are the angels, we shall participate in His beatitude to the full extent of our capacity. Hence our inborn desire for happiness shall be fulfilled.

Truly can the philosophy of Aristotle be called a *Praeparatio Evangelica,* a preparation for the Gospel of Christ. (33) The logical conclusion of Aristotle's moral philosophy is that man must be assimilated to the beatitude of God in order to perfectly realize his natural desire for happiness, as we have already shown. This is exactly what divine revelation tells us, as we have just seen.

Accordingly, St. Thomas concludes that man in heaven will attain to perfect happiness by means of the intellectual operation which is contemplation of God. This beatitude will be without interruption and eternal inasmuch as man will be

---

(30) Aristotles, *Ethics,* I, 10, 1101 a.
(31) *I Corinthians,* XII, 12.
(32) Mathew, XX, 30.
(33) Cf. Turner, William, *History of Philosophy,* p. 215.

permanently joined to God. (34) The results of this conclusion are far reaching.

4. *The End of Individuals and of Society.* — We saw in the last chapter, that for Aristotle the end of the individual and the end of the state are one and the same. Now, in the light of Christian principles, we find that this Aristotelian idea retains its validity and St. Thomas employs it in order to determine the proper end of civil society. The validity of this point rests on the fact that civil society is an unity of order, an ens ordinis, as Peter Lumbreras de Alvernia points out. (35)

St. Thomas concludes that since any society is in its very nature a group of people co-operating in pursuit of a common goal, the end of the society is the same as the end of each co-operator. They are merely working together in order to achieve a goal that is common to all of them. (36)

The good that men seek by forming a society may be of any kind but, whatever the good is, it will determine the nature of the society. For example, workmen form labor unions as a means of co-operating in pursuit of better wages and working conditions and their societies are characterized by these objectives. Now the purpose for which civil society was formed is a better life for each man than would be

---

(34) *Sum. Theol.*, I- II, qu. 3, art. 2: « Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, quando *erimus sicut angeli in caelo*, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII, 30. Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam cessat obiectio quia una et continua et sempiterna operatione in illo beatitudinis statu mens hominis Deo coniungitur. »

(35) Petrus Lumbreras de Alvernia in Comment V in Pol. VII, lect. 1: « finis optimae reipublicae sumitur ex optimo fine hominis, quia respublica nihil aliud est quam ordo civitatis. »

(36) *De Regimine Principum*, liber, 1, caput 14. Idem autem oportet esse judicium de fine totius multitudinis et unius. Si igitur finis hominis esse bonum quodcumque in ipso epistens et regendae multitudinis finis ultimus esset similiter ut tale bonum multitudo acquireret et in eo permaneret. »

possible to any single one living alone (37) and this is in keeping with what we found Aristotle to hold. Moreover, he says with Aristotle, that a good life is a life of virtue. (38) Consequently Thomas and Aristotle agree in the conclusion that human society exists for the sake of virtuous living. (39)

That men live in communion with each other not that they might live but that they might live well, St. Thomas (40) proves by making his own the words of Aristotle: « a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state. » (41)

Although he follows the Stagirite closely, he does not hold that virtuous living finds its end in man himself but maintains that a virtuous life is the means whereby man is directed to a further end, namely the contemplation of God. (42) St. Thomas says that human society is oriented to God as to its end in the same way that an army is ordered to the commanding officer as to its end. (43)

Now it is plain that the individual soldier, insofar as he is a soldier, is ordered to the commanding officer as to his end. But he is not the only one who is so ordered. The fact

---

(37) *De Regimine Principum*, liber 1, caput 14: « Videtur... finis esse multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem. Ad hoc enim homines congregantur, ut simul bene vivant, quod consequi non posset unusquisque singulariter vivens; bona autem vita est secundum virtutem; virtuosa igitur vita est congregationis humanae finis. »

(38) *Ibidem.*

(39) *Ibidem.*

(40) *De Regimine Principum*, liber, 1, caput 14: « Huius autem signum est, quod hi soli partes sint multitudinis congregatae, qui sibi invicem communicant in bene vivendo. Si enim propter solum vivere homines convenirent, animalia et servi essent pars aliqua congregationis civilis. »

(41) Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 9, 1280 a.

(42) *De Regimine Principum*, liber, 1, caput 14: « Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosum vitam pervenire ad fruitione divinam. »

(43) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 100, art. 6: « Finis autem humanae vitae et societatis est Deus... sicut etiam in exercitu, qui ordinatur ad ducem sicut ad finem. »

that he and many others are so ordered is what makes the army what it is. The one soldier and the many have the same end. So using the analogy of the army, Aquinas says that the end of both man's existence and that of society is God. (44)

5. *Christian Love of Neighbor.* — The Angelic Doctor denounces the notion that man should seek only his own good as being repugnant no less to Christian charity than to right reason. (45)

As St. Paul says, charity « seeketh not her own. » (46) « Let no man seek his own, but that which is another's (47) he admonishes the Corinthians.

As to himself, the Apostle says: « As I also in all things please all men, not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that the many be saved. » (48)

Hence in view of the Christian principle of charity St. Thomas can say with the Stagirite that the common good is superior to private good.

Moreover, in sayings this, he would have the support of no less an authority than St. Augustine who finds this implication in the words of St. Paul; « charity.. seeketh not her own. » (49) And in general it appears that the statement that

---

(44) *Ibidem.*

(45) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 47, art. 10: « sicut Philosophus dicit, quidam posuerunt quod prudentia non se extendit ad bonum commune sed solum ad bonum proprium; et hoc ideo quia existimabant quod non oportet hominem quaerere nisi bonum proprium. Sed haec aestimatio repugnat charitati, *quae non quaerit quae sua sunt*, ut dicitur I, Cor. XIII, 5. Unde et Apostolus de seipso dicit: *Non quaerens quod quod mihi utile sit, sed quod multis, ut salvi fiant.* Repugnat etiam rationi rectae. »

(46) I, *Corinthians*, XIII, 5.

(47) *Ibidem*, X, 24.

(48) *Ibidem*, X, 33.

(49) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3: « sicut Augustinus dicit [*The* reference to St. Augustine is: « In regula, tom. I. »] cum dicitur: 'Charitas non quaerit quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur quod communia propriis anteponit.' Semper autem commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium;

the common good is superior to private good is completely at home in Christian theology. We have seen the justification of the statement made early in our investigation to the effect that Thomistic theology supplements and perfects social philosophy.

---

sicut etiam, ipsi parti et magis amabile bonum totius quam bonum partiale sui ipsius.»

Part Four

AN APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO THE FRAMEWORK

Chapter VII.

THE RELATION OF THE PART TO THE WHOLE IN THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

1. *The Universe.* — In the universe, the relation of the part to the whole lends itself to syllogistic elucidation thusly: the less perfect parts of the universe exist for the more perfect; (1) but the most perfect of all created things is the order of the universe; (2) therefore the parts of the universe exist for the order of the whole universe. (3) This will become more apparent upon a closer examination of pertinent passages in St. Thomas. According to the Thomistic concept, the order of the universe is, before all else, an order of finality. (4) Not only is creation in its totality oriented to a transcendental goal, namely God, but design runs all through its individual parts from the lowest on up to the highest. In every instance the less perfect is oriented

---

(1) *Sum Theol.*, II-II, qu. 64, art. 1: « In rerum autem ordine imperfectoria sunt propter perfectoria... Et ideo si homo utatur plantis ad utilitatem animalium, et animalibus ad utilitatem hominum, non est illicitum... »

(2) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber II, cap. 42: « Optimum in rebus creatis est perfectio universi. »

(3) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2: « Singulae autem creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. »

(4) Cfr. Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 71: « Der organisch geschaute ordo universi ist vor allem ein ordo finium. »

to the more perfect as to its end (5) and the inferior is subject to the superior. (6)

As we have already had occasion to mention in connection with the order of the universe, plants could not grow without the mineral kingdom while they themselves provide food for and thus sustain the animal kingdom. Just as animals make use of plants men make use of animals. The less perfect exists for the more perfect. (7)

But the most perfect of all created things is the universe itself. (8) Thomas never tires of emphasizing the superiority of the universe over its parts. (9) He refers to it as the supreme good of the created order. (10) He says that its goodness outweighs the goodness of any particular thing in the same way that the good of a whole people preponderates that of one man. (11) God, he declares, prefers this good to any particular one. (12) The ultimate end of divine volition is, in fact, goodness itself, and the closest approach to it that

---

(5) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 66, art. 1: « semper enim imperfectiora sunt propter perfectiora. »

(6) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 59, art. 6 ad 3: « ut Augustinus dicit, ' inferiora quodam ordine reguntur a Deo per superiora. ' »

(7) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 64, art. 1: « In rerum autem ordine imperfectiora sunt propter perfectiora,... ita etiam ea quae tantum vivunt, ut plantae, sunt communiter propter animalia; omnia autem animalia sunt propter hominem... inter alios autem usus maxime necessarius esse videtur ut animalia plantis utantur in cibum, et homines animalibus, quod sine mortificatione eorum fieri non potest. Et ideo licitum est et plantas mortificare in usum animalium, et animalia in usum hominum, ex ipsa ordinatione divina... »

(8) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, cap. 44: « Optimum in rebus creatis est perfectio universi; » cfr. also *ibidem*, lib. II, cap. 42.

(9) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Principien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 68: « Thomas ermüdet nicht, das Uebergewicht des Universum über seine Teile zu betonen. »

(10) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 64: « maxime bonum in rebus causatis est bonum ordinis universi, quod est maxime perfectum. »

(11) *II Sent.*, Dist. 29, qu. 1, art. 3 ad 4: « bonum universi praeponderat bono particularis rei, sicut bonum gentis est divinus quam bonum hominis, ut in 1. Eth. c. 1 Philosophus dicit. »

(12) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 84: « Deus principalius vult bonum universitatis suorum effectum quam aliquid bonum particulare. »

can be found in the created order is the good to be found in the order of the whole universe. (13)

The reason for this superiority of the universe over its parts hearkens back to a principle mentioned earlier in our investigation, namely, that creatures exist to represent and to reflect the perfection of God. The more perfect the creature the more perfectly it represents the goodness of God. The universe in its totality participates in the divine goodness more abundantly than any particular creature and perforce it represents that goodness more extensively than single creatures. (14)

The parts of the universe are only relatively good and that goodness is through relation to the whole. God has coordinated each creature to the whole. (15) The single creature is good in itself but that goodness is fully realized only to contribute to the goodness of the whole created order. (16) Every particular good of this or of that thing is ordered to the goood of the order of the whole universe as to an end just as the less perfect is oriented to the which is more perfect. (17)

Even the imperfections of the individual parts, in fact all the evil that exists in the world, find their explanation, the reason of their being, in the perfection, the greater good and the beauty of the universe. If we may call an imperfection or an evil a *part*, it is a part that exists for the good of the whole. St. Thomas explains this in his *Summa Theologi-*

---

(13) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 64: « Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi. »

(14) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 47, art. 1: « Perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum quam alia quaecumque creatura. »

(15) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 56, art. 2 ad 4: « Deus unamquamque creaturam facit proportionatam universo. »

(16) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 69: « singula sunt in seipsis bona, simul autem sunt optima propter ordinem universi. »

(17) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 64: « cum ad ipsu (bonum ordinis totius universi) ordinetur, sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum huius vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius. »

ae (18) in his *Summa Contra Gentiles* (19) and in *De Regimine Principum.* (20)

Therefore, the part of the universe is found to exist for the whole of the universe. (21) « The part for the whole, the less perfect for the more perfect: that » says Linhardt, (22) « is the everlasting refrain » of the Angelic Doctor.

In one passage, Aquinas says that the universe is constituted of creatures as a whole is composed of parts. He compares the relation of part and whole to the relation of matter and form. He affirms that parts exist for the perfection of the whole and in particular that creatures exist for the perfection of the universe. (23) This thought recurs many times in St. Thomas. (24)

---

(18) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 48, art. 2: « perfectio universi requirit inaequalitatem esse in rebus, ut omnes bonitatis gradus impleantur ... Sicut igitur perfectio universitatis rerum requirit ut non solum sintentia incorruptibilia, sed etiam corruptibilia: ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint: ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere. In hoc autem consistit ratio mali. »

(19) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber II, caput, 44: « Optimum ... in rebus creatis est perfectio universi, quae consistit in ordine distinctarum rerum: in omnibus enim perfectio totius praeminet perfectioni singularium partium ... cum bonum totius sit melius quam bonum partium singularium, non est optimi factoris diminuere bonum totius ut aliquarum partium augeat bonitatem: non enim aedificator fundamento tribuit eam bonitatem quam tribuit tecto, ne domum faciat ruinosam. Factor igitur omnium, Deus, non faceret totum universum in suo genere optimum, si faceret omnes partes aequales: quia multi gradus bonitatis in universo deessent, et sic esset imperfectum. »

(20) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 9: « Maius autem et divinius est bonum multitudinis quam bonum unius: unde interdum malum unius sustinetur, si in bonum multitudinis cedat ... Et ipse Deus mala esse in mundo non sineret, nisi ex eis bona eliceret ad utilitatem et pulchritudinem universi. »

(21) *Ibidem*, « unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. »

(22) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 68: « pars propter totum, imperfectum propter perfectum: das ist der ewige Refrain. »

(23) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2: « ex omnibus creaturis constituitur totum universum, sicut totum ex partibus ... omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam; partes enim sunt quasi materia totius ... Singulae autem creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. »

(24) *Sum. Theol.*, I. qu. 65, art. 2: I-II, qu. 2, art. 8 ad 2, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, cap. 42 and cap. 44; lib. III, cap. 64 and cap. 112.

2. *The Social Cosmos.* — Turning to the social order we can discover the status of the part in regard to the whole if we but have recourse to the Thomistic analogy between the social cosmos and the universe.

On the basis of this analogy, Linhardt says that, « like the universe itself, humanity on the whole . . . , is an order of unity ruled for feature by the same laws that regulate the universe. There is the same plurality and diversity of individual parts, the same real relation between the parts, the same ' *partes ordinari ad perfectionem totius* ' in the form of ' *dirigere ad bonum commune* ' . . . the same submission of the particular orders under the universal social order... And finally, there runs all through the same social plan: ' *bonum commune est eminentius quam bonum singulare, sicut bonum gentis est eminentius quam civitatis vel familiae vel personae.* ' (The common good is superior to individual good in the same way that the good of an entire nation comes before that of a city or that of a family or that of a person). » (25)

That this idea, namely, that the common good comes before the good of the individual, runs all through Thomistic literature is emphatically reaffirmed by Kurz (26) who claims that it is to be found therein no less than sixty times. He

---

(25) Linhardt, Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 75. « Wie das Universum selbst, ist auch die Menschheit im Ganzen wie im Einzelnen eine unitas ordinis, Zug für Zug von den gleichen Gesetzen wie das Universum beherrscht. Die gleiche Vielheit und Verschiedenheit der Individuen, die gleiche relatio realis zwischen den Individuen, das gleiche partes ordinari ad perfectionem totius in der Form des dirigere ad bonum commune... die gleiche Unterordnung der particulares ordines unter den sozialen universalis ordo... und schliesslich quer durch alles dieses hindurch die gleiche Gemeinschaftsidee: bonum commune est eminentius quam bonum singulare, sicut bonum gentis est eminentius quam civitatis vel familiae vel personae. » Translation given above is our own.

(26) Kurz, P. Edelbert, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 47: « Diese . . . Stelle bringt der hl. Thomas in etwa der Form ' bonum commune (multitudinis) est maius (melius) et divinius quam bonum unius (bono privato) ' wörtlich oder in Anwendung etwa sechzigmal in seinen Werken, in S. Th. einundzwanzigmal, S. c. G. siebenmal, Sent. neunzehnmal . . . »

says that it appears twenty-one times in the *Summa Theologiae*, seven times in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and nineteen times in the Commentary on the Sentences. The other pertinent passages are scattered.

Sometimes it is to be found only implicitly as, for instance, in one place where St. Thomas says that the more widespread or diffused a good is the more godlike it is. (27) In most instances, however, Aquinas is quite explicit.

He says definitely that the common good is better than the good of one person (28) and he cites Holy Scripture to prove his contention. He quoted the words of St. Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians: « Charity . . . seeketh not her own » (29) and he points out that St. Augustine interprets these words of the Apostle to mean that the common good comes before one's own good. (30) He considers the principle to be either so well established or so patently true that he employs it in theological argument time and again.

In proving that the good of the universe preponderates the good of individual parts, he takes it for granted that this principle is valid in the social order and he proceeds to apply it to the order of the universe. (31)

The problem of capital punishment is solved by an application of the same principle in this manner: He says that parts exist for the whole in the way the less perfect exists for the more perfect. In the case of the human body, if a member is corrupt and is in a way to spread its corrup-

---

(27) *II. Sent.*, Dist. XI, qu. 1, art. 2, 4; « Quanto bonum est communius, tanto est divinius, secundum Philosophum . . . »

(28) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 47, art. 10: « bonum commune sit melius, quam bonum unius. »

(29) *I Corinthians*, XIII, 4 and 5, cited by St. Thomas in *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 47, art. 10; *ibidem*, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3.

(30) St. Augustine in *Regula*, tom. 1, cited by St. Thomas in *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3.

(31) *II Sent.*, Dist. XXXI, qu. 2, art. 2: « Sicut bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius hominis . . . ita etiam bonum universi. »

tion to the whole body, it is both salubrious and praiseworthy to amputate it. But the individual person is compared to the whole community as a part to a whole and, accordingly, if some man should be a peril to the community and a source of corruption because of his evil doing, it is praiseworthy to kill him to the end that the commonweal might be served. (32) And this same rule obtains also in the governing of the universe inasmuch as God inflicts punishments not for His own satisfaction but out of love for His creatures. Since the good of the universe consists in its order, those who would disrupt that order are penalized. (33)

The principle that the common good is more divine than private good is the norm that St. Thomas uses in measuring the comparative value of the virtues. He holds that the more a virtue tends to the good of the multitude the better it is. Accordingly, the virtue of temperance, which tends solely to the moderation of concupiscence and pleasure, pertains solely to the man who practices the virtue and, in consequence, is not as great a virtue as justice or fortitude. The virtue of fortitude will dispose a man to undergo the perils of war to save the community while justice regulates his dealings with the other members of the community individually and collectivelly. (34)

---

(32) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 64, art. 2: « omnia pars ordinatur ad totum ut imperfectum ad perfectum; et ideo omnis pars naturaliter est propter totum. Et propter hoc videmus quod si saluti totius corporis humani expediat praeciso alicuius membri, puta cum est putridum vel corruptivum aliorum membrorum, laudabiliter et salubriter abscinditur. Quaelibet autem persona singularis comparatur ad totum communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Et ideo si aliquis homo sit periculosus communitati, et corruptivus ipsius propter aliquod peccatum, laudabiliter et salubriter occiditur, ut bonum commune servetur. »

See also: *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 9.

(33) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 144: « Est autem concedendum quod poenae inferuntur a Deo non propter se, quasi Deus in ipsis delectetur, sed propter aliud: scilicet propter ordinem imponendum creaturis, in quo bonum universi consistit. »

(34) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 141, art. 8: « Sicut Philosophus dicit, 'bonum multitudinis divinius est quam bonum unius;' et ideo quanto aliqua virtus

In fact it is this principle that is the basis of the Christian teaching that a man should defend his country in a just war. Such a war has for its end the conservation of the state and since the good that is common to many men is more divine than the good of one man, it follows that it is a virtuous act for a man to risk his life for the common good whether that good be of the spiritual or of the temporal order, as St. Thomas puts it. (35) Nay more, the good of the civil society is the supreme good outside of the supernatural. (36) Patriotism is a virtue, inasmuch as the doctrine that one ought to put the good of many before one's own good has its basis in the Christian principle of charity. (37)

The teaching on almsgiving likewise involves the same principle inasmuch as a man is never obliged to deprive himself or his dependents of the necessities of life in order to give alms to another unless that other be one upon whom the common good of many people depends, for example, a sovereign ruler. If such an important person should be in dire circumstances it would be laudable for a man to give not only of his external goods but of life itself, if need be,

---

magis pertinet ad bonum multitudinis, tanto melior est. Iustitia autem et fortitudo magis pertinent ad bonum multitudinis quam temperantia: quia iustitia consistit in communicationibus, quae sunt ad alterum; fortitudo autem in periculis bellorum, quae sustinentur pro salute communi; temperentia autem moderatur solum concupiscentiae et delectationes eorum quae pertinent ad ipsum hominem. Unde manifestum est quod iustitia et fortitudo sunt excellentiores.»

(35) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 31, art. 3 ad 2: «bonum multorum commune divinius est quam bonum unius. Une pro bono communi reipublicae vel spirituali, vel temporali, virtuosum est quod aliquis etiam propriam vitam exponat periculo ... communicatio in bellicis actibus ordinetur ad conservationem reipublicae.»

(36) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 124, art. 5 ad 3: «bonum reipublicae est praecipuum inter bona humana. Sed bonum divinum .... est potius quam humanum.»

(37) *De Regimine Principum*, liber III, caput 4: «amor patriae in radice charitatis fundatur. quae communia propriis, non propria communibus anteponit, ut beatus Augustinus dicit exponens verbum Apostoli de charitate.»

because the good common to many takes precedence over private good. (38)

This idea becomes clearer when St. Thomas says that a civil authority can, in a sense, be said to hold the common welfare in himself. The Angelic Doctor points out that there is a certain human good which does not consist in the community itself but pertains, rather, to one person. It is a good that this person holds, however, not for his own use or benefit but for the use of all the people. (39) Such a good pertains to any person in authority and the measure in which it pertains to him is in direct proportion to his rank in the hierarchy of authorities. Naturally then, a sovereign to whom the custody of a whole people is entrusted takes precedence over all others. (40)

We could go on in this way for many pages (41) but we think that we have cited a sufficient number of cases where

---

(38) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 32, art. 6: « si aliquis in articulo necessitatis constitutus haberet solum unde posset sustentari, et filii sui vel alii ad eum pertinentes; de hoc enim necessario eleemosynam dare, est sibi et suis vitam subtrahere. Ses de hoc dico nisi forte casus immineret, ubi subtrahendo sibi, daret alicui magnae personae, per quam Ecclesia vel respublicae sustentaretur; quia pro talis personae liberatione seipsum et suos laudabiliter periculo mortis exponeret; cum bonum commune sit proprio praeferendum. »

(39) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 80: « Est etiam aliquod humanum bonum quod non in communitate consistit, sed ad unum aliquem pertinet secundum seipsum, non tamen uni soli utilia, sed multis » — « in rebus humanis est aliquod bonum commune, quod quidem est bonum civitatis vel gentis (I Eth., II, 8; 1094 b) quod videtur ad Principatuum ordinem pertinere. » The brackets are as found in the text.

(40) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 113, art. 3: « quanto agens fuerit universalius, tanto est superius. Sic igitur custodia humanae multitudinis pertinet ad Principatum. »

(41) The following passages would permit of lengthy elucidation: *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 48, art. 2; qu. 113, art. 3; I-II, qu. 90, art. 3 ad 3; qu. 105, art. 3 obj. 5; II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3; qu. 31, art. 3 ad 2; qu. 32, art. 6; qu. 134, art. 1 ad 3; qu. 185, art. 2; — *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber II, cap. 44; liber III, cap. 80 et 144 — *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 2; liber III, lect. 14; liber X, lect. 11. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Cf. Kurz, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft*, p. 46 ff.

St. Thomas unequivocally accepts as valid the Aristotelian principle that the good common to many is more important than a good proper to one person and that the part exists for the sake of the whole as the less perfect exists for the more perfect.

Not only does this idea apply to human society but, as we have seen, it runs all through Thomistic theology. It is, as Linhardt (42) says, « the everlasting refrain. » As St. Thomas points out, St. Augustine accepts the principle, and the latter in turn, interprets the teaching of St. Paul on charity in this light.

3. *The One Condition upon Which the Principle's Validity depends.* — There is only one condition that the Angelic Doctor lays down for the application of this rule. He simply asks us to be logical. We can apply the principle only when the same kind of good is predicated of the one and of the many. And in a number of instances St. Thomas demonstrates that the principle is not valid if that one condition is not observed.

On the strength of the principle that the good common to many is more important than the good of one person, the following objections are set down in the *Summa Theologiae*:

The Eucharist is a sacrament that benefits the one who receives it, but the sacrament of matrimony is directed to the common good, namely the perpetuation of the human race. Therefore the sacrament of matrimony excels the Eucharistic sacrament. (43) And, by the same token, virginity, which is

---

(42) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 68.

(43) *Sum. Theol.*, III, qu. 65, art. 3, obj. 1: « Videtur quod sacramentum Eucharistiae non sit potissimum inter sacramenta. Bonum enim potius est quam bonum unius, ut dicitur. Sed matrimonium ordinatur ad bonum commune speciei humanae per viam generationis; sacramentum autem Eucharistiae ordinatur ad bonum proprium sumentis. Ergo non est potissimum sacramentorum. »

ordained to the betterment of the one who practices it, is a state inferior to the married state. (44)

The grace of union is proper to Christ alone but habitual grace is common to Christ and men, therefore habitual grace is greater than the grace peculiar to the Divine Person. (45)

The justification of a sinner is centered in one man but the good of the universe is better than the good of one being and therefore the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of a sinner. (46)

St. Thomas says that all of these objections are invalid because in each case the two things compared are not in the same genus. Matrimony, he points out, is directed to the *corporal* common good while the Eucharist contains within itself the *spiritual* good common to the whole church. (47) And likewise, virginity which is dedicated to God is not to be compared with carnal fecundity. (48) As for the grace of union proper to Christ, it is above all genus as is the Divine Person Himself. (49) And finally, the order

---

(44) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 152, art. 4, obj. 3: « bonum commune potius est bono privato... Sed coniugium ordinatur ad bonum commune... virginitas autem ordinatur ad bonum speciale... Ergo virginitas non est potior continentia coniugali.

(45) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 7, art. 13, obj. 3: « commune est prius proprio. Sed gratia habitualis est communis Christo et aliis hominibus: gratia autem unionis est propria Christo. Ergo prior est secundum intellectum gratia habitualis quam ipsa uni. »

(46) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 113, art. 9, obj. 2: « iustificatio impii ordinatur ad bonum particulare unius hominis. Sed bonum universi est maius quam bonum unius hominis. Ergo maius opus est creatio caeli et terrae, quam iustificatio impii. »

(47) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 65, art. 3, ad 1: « matrimonium ordinatur ad commune bonum corporaliter; sed bonum commune spirituale totius Ecclesiae continetur substantialiter in ipso Eucharistiae sacramento. »

(48) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 152, art. 4 ad 3: « bonum commune potius est bono privato, si sit eius dem generis; sed potest esse quod bonum privatum sit melius secundum suum genus. Et hoc modo virginitas Deo dicata praefertur foecunditati carnali. »

(49) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 7, art. 13 ad 3: « quod commune est prius proprio si utrumque sit unius generis; sed in his quae sunt diversorum generum, nihil

of grace is above the order of nature and accordingly the grace of one man is of greater importance than the natural good of the whole universe. (50)

These instances and others that can be cited in Thomistic theology (51) show that for St. Thomas the idea that the common good is more important than private good always carries with it the condition either explicit or implied, that the two things compared be of the same kind. Therefore, to say that man exists for the state would be as great an error as to say that the married state is superior to vowed virginity or that the sacrament of matrimony is greater than the Eucharistic sacrament, because, as we have already shown, the good of man as a man is not in the same genus as the good of civil society.

One who would say, moreover, that man's spiritual welfare should be subordinate to the state would make the same error as one who would say that the work of creation is greater than the justification of a human soul, because, as we have also seen, men's spiritual welfare is not the charge of the state.

However, in view of the facts that « civil society » and « citizen » are in the same genus and that man, insofar as he is a citizen, is a part of the whole that is society, we can say that man insofar as he is a citizen exists for the civil society.

Man as man, however, is, as we pointed our earlier in our work, wholly independent of the unity of order that is civil society and the good of man insofar as he is man is super-

---

prohibet proprium esse prius communi. Gratia autem unionis non est in genere gratiae habitualis; sed est supra omne geneus, sicut et ipsa divina persona. Unde hoc proprium nihil prohibet esse prius communi; quia non se habet per additionem ad commune, sed potius est principium et origo eius quod est commune. »

(50) *Ibidem*, I-II, qu. 113, art. 9, ad 2: « bonum universi est maius quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque in eodem genere. Sed bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi. »

(51) *Cfr. Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 185, art. 2, obj. 1 and ad 1.

natural in contradistinction to the temporal well-being that man seeks in the role of a citizen.

Now St. Thomas points out that when the private good is not of the same genus as the common good nothing prohibits the private good from a position of priority over the common good, (52) and in such a case if it so happens that the private good is of a higher genus than the common good it is in fact, in virtue of its genus, superior to the common good. (53)

Therefore, the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the relation of the individual to society may be stated thusly: the private good of the citizen is subordinate to the good that is common to all of the citizens but the good that is proper to man, considered as man and apart from his role as a citizen, is above and beyond the state.

---

(52) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 7, art. 13 ad 3: « in his quae sunt diversorum generum, nihil prohibet proprium esse prius communi. »

(53) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 152, art. 4 ad 3: « potest esse quod bonum privatum sit melius secundum suum genus. »

CONCLUSION

We launched upon our investigation by examining the framework or skeleton upon which the Thomistic social theory is constructed. We saw that for Aquinas the whole of creation is one great collectivity and that the individual parts of this unity of order are the creatures. Again we saw that the human race is a whole and that its individual parts are men. Finally we saw that the citizen is the only part that corresponds to the whole called the *civitas*, the civil society or the state.

After we had determined these facts we proceeded to search out the theory of the Angelic Doctor and we applied this theory to the framework that we had previously exposed. The application of the theory to the whole of Thomistic theology may be summed up thusly:

Creatures exist for the good common to creation, which is the perfection of the universe and the objective glory of God.

Man exists for the good common to mankind, which is the Beatific Vision and the formal glory of God.

The citizen exists for the good common to the civil, society, which is the good life in the natural order.

Our conclusion that the citizen exists for the city will, no doubt, ring with a note of novelty in the ears of many because more familar is the conclusion that the state exists for the citizen and not the citizen for the state. (1)

---

(1) De Wulf, Maurice, « L'Individu et la groupe dans la Scolastique du XIII[e] Siècle » in *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie*, (XXII, Nov. 1920) p. 342: « L'Etat est pour le bien du citoyen, et ce n'est pas inversement le citoyen qui est pour l'Etat. »

A Thomistic text (2) is often quoted in support of this conclusion. However, in this passage St. Thomas points out that in so far as a man is a soldier and in sofar as man is a citizen he is a part of the whole that is the army and the city respectively. Yet both the army and the city are merely unities of order and the significance of this fact is that, inasmuch as a unity of order is made up of individual parts that have, each of them, an existence that is independent of the whole, man has an existence that is independent of both the army and the state.

The fact that both the army and the state are unities of order makes it possible for man as man to be superior to the army and the state but at the same time to be subordinate to them in so far as he is, respectively, a soldier or a citizen. (3) Hence, it is perhaps better to say that the state exists for *man* than to say that the state exists for the *citizen*.

Although, in passing, we have touched upon such questions as patriotism and the duty of defending one's country, nevertheless, the formal consideration of particular problems that attend upon the relation of the individual to society is beyond the scope of this treatise. But we rest confident that all such problems can be solved by the application of the principle that the good common to many is to be preferred to the good proper to one provided that both the common good and the private good are of the same kind or genus. And, on the other hand, we believe that the difficulties that now exist are largely due to a failure to recognize this rule.

Not a new rule in any sense is this. It finds its origin not in St. Thomas but in the words of Christ Himself: « Render

---

(2) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 1: « Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo ... habet solum unitatem ordinis, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum. Et ideo pars eius totius potest habere operationem quae non est operatio totius. »

(3) Cfr. *Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1, art. 9; « bonum ... hominis in quantum est civis, est ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes. » See also *Sum. Theol.* qu. 21, art. 4, ad 3.

to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's. »

As for Aristotle's connection with it, it seems hardly fair to condemn him for having taught only the half of it, namely, « Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's » without adding « and to God the things that are God's. »

We feel that the fight waged by some against Aristotelian social thought is a bit quixotic. They are making an enemy of the Stagirite after fashion of Don Quixote's riding forth to do battle with a windmill.

Now we see that the Christian doctrine of charity supplements and perfects Aristotle's teaching on the relation of the individual to Society. St. Augustine says: « Charitas non quaerit quae sua sint, sic intelligitur quod communia propriis anteponit. » To this St. Thomas adds: « commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium. » (4)

We have shown that it is not a question of antithesis between social philosophy and theology. Our efforts have not been to disown Aristotelian social thought, which is acknowledged to be « a fountain head of scientific knowledge concerning the state, » (5) but rather to fill up what was void in it and in general to perfect that great heritage. Granted that it is good, Christian principles make it better.

The chief difference between Aristotle and St. Thomas seems to lie in a fact that Kurz points out.(6) For the former the ideal state where man can attain to happiness is but a dream, but for Thomas the kingdom of heaven is a reality.

---

(4) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3: « sicut Augustinus dicit, cum dicitur: « Charitas non quaerit quae sua sint, sic intelligitur quod communia propriis anteponit. » Semper autem commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium; sicut etiam ipsi parti est magis amabile bonum totius quam bonum partiale sui ipsius. »

(5) Shephard, Walter James, « Political Science » in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 396.

(6) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft bein hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 105.